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A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative
Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of
Telecommunications Mergers
Rachel E. Barkowt
Peter W. Hubertt
Currently, most telecommunications mergers require ap-
proval of both the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
and the Department of Justice ("DOJ").1 Although the agencies'
respective statutory mandates differ-the FCC reviews mergers
under the Communications Act's broad "public interest" standard
and DOJ follows the competition-based standard of the federal
antitrust laws-the agencies themselves both claim to focus their
review on what they believe to be the merger's effect on competi-
tion.2 That is, the FCC sees its role as that of a shadow DOJ,
analyzing mergers under the public interest standard to deter-
mine how they will influence competition in the telecommunica-
tions industry. Despite this claimed overlap, their approaches-
and, consequently, frequently their outcomes-are markedly dif-
ferent.
t Associate, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, PLLC, Washington, D.C. Co-
author (with Peter W. Huber, et al), Mergers and Acquisitions, in Peter W. Huber, Michael
K Kellogg, and John Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law (Aspen 2d ed 1999). Both
authors would like to thank Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Anthony Barkow for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Although both authors represented Bell tele-
phone companies in some of the mergers discussed in this Article, the views expressed in
this Article are solely those of the authors and are based entirely on public information.
tt Partner, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, PLLC, Washington, D.C. Co-
author (with Michael K. Kellogg and John Thorne) Federal Telecommunications Law
(Aspen 2d ed 1999).
1 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") also has authority to review mergers and
acquisitions under sections 1 and 6 of the FTC Act, 15 USC §§ 41, 46 (1994). The Clayton
Act, however, strips the FTC of its jurisdiction to review mergers and acquisitions between
common carriers and instead vests that authority in the FCC. See 15 USC § 21(a) (1994).
The FTC retains authority over cable and mass media mergers, though, in practice, the
FTC and DOJ have formalized a "clearance" process by which the agencies voluntarily
divide authority over a particular merger. See James R. Weiss and Martin L. Stern, Serv-
ing Two Masters: Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Justice Department Over Tele-
communications Transactions, 6 Commlaw Conspectus 195, 198 (1998).
2 Weiss and Stern, 6 Commlaw Conspectus at 206 ("In analyzing whether a particu-
lar merger raises any competitive concerns, the FCC and DOJ are performing essentially
the same tasks.") (cited in note 1).
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This Article explores the underpinnings of these differences.
As we explain, the core source of the disparity is the agencies'
generally differing views of how best to promote competition. The
Commission starts with a bias toward regulation whereas the
Department tends to favor the free market. From this fundamen-
tal distinction in agency mindset flows a variety of consequences.
This Article will consider how these different visions influence
both the substantive and procedural choices of the two agencies.
By comparing the FCC's methodology and bias with that of the
Department, we gain a more coherent understanding of how the
procedural preferences of an agency influence substantive out-
comes and how an agency's substantive agenda influences its
choice of procedure. While we consider both agencies, our empha-
sis is on how the FCC's deeply imbedded preference for regulation
influences its choice of a procedural model and how, in turn, that
model impedes the Telecommunications Act of 1996's goal of
promoting competition and deregulation. We will also explore the
dangers of the Commission's approach as a more general matter
of antitrust and administrative law.3
This Article begins in Part I by describing the substantive
and procedural approaches of the Commission and the Depart-
ment to telecommunications mergers. Part II explores the source
of the variation in treatment. Specifically, we explain how the
agencies' differing views of markets and regulation influence
their substantive merger standards, and we offer an evaluation of
those substantive policies. In Part III, we consider how the agen-
cies' views of governance intersect with their procedural philoso-
phies. We focus in particular on how the FCC uses procedure to
achieve its substantive goals. We then discuss the consequences
of the procedural model pursued by the Commission.
I. FCC AND DOJ DUAL REVIEW
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS
Federal review of telecommunications mergers provides the
ideal opportunity to analyze two dissimilar substantive and pro-
cedural approaches to mergers. Although DOJ and the FCC both
place great weight on "competitive effects" in evaluating mergers,
they give different content to that standard. In this section, we
begin by explaining the origins and consequences of dual review
3 Our focus is on the FCC because, as we explain, its approach-far more than the
Department's-represents a significant departure from traditional models of substantive
antitrust policy and administrative procedure.
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by both the Department and the Commission. We then describe
the respective substantive approaches of the two agencies.
A. The Origins and Consequences of Dual Review
Dual review of the same issue by two federal bodies is rare. It
is, after all, highly inefficient to have two decision-makers wrestle
with the same issue when one can do the job alone. Multiple lay-
ers of review result in delay, uncertainty, and wasted resources. 4
For example, a merging telecommunications party must respond
to frequently overlapping requests for information from both DOJ
and the FCC.5 To appease the FCC, a merging party must file an
application for approval (which includes a public interest state-
ment); often, the merging party must then respond to hundreds of
pages of comments, provide additional documents, meet with the
Commission staff, and spend months negotiating conditions.6
Frequently, the FCC's requests follow on the heels of DOJ's in-
vestigation, which is also likely to require the production of thou-
sands of pages of documents and countless hours of corporate ex-
ecutives' time, as they must respond to various discovery requests
and perhaps depositions. Both processes, of course, involve sub-
stantial legal fees.7 And at the end of the day, the FCC extracts
little information that has not already been produced for the De-
partment of Justice, and vice versa.
Moreover, the dual review means that a merger between tele-
communications companies will take far longer than mergers
generally. The average merger takes two to four months to con-
4 See William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC,
38 Emory L J 715, 754 (1989) ("Because the industry is subject to two sets of antitrust
laws, regulatory costs to the government and to the industry have increased.").
5 The agencies often conduct their reviews simultaneously, though DOJ tends to
finish long before the FCC.
6 It is difficult to predict which mergers the FCC will subject to lengthier reviews and
which it will give relatively cursory treatment. One of the FCC commissioners testified
before Congress that "[tihe Commission annually approves tens of thousands of license
transfers without any scrutiny or comment; others receive minimal review, and a select
few are subjected to intense regulatory scrutiny ... . Unfortunately, there is no estab-
lished Commission standard for distinguishing between the license transfers that trigger
extensive analysis by the full Commission and those that do not." Testimony of FCC
Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth Before the House Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, on the Telecom-
munications Merger Review Act of 2000, 4 (Mar 14, 2000), <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
FurchtgottRoth/2000/sphfr004.html> (visited May 6, 2000).
7 Weiss and Stern, 6 Commlaw Conspectus at 206 (cited in note 1).
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clude.' Telecommunications mergers, however, take between nine
and twelve months to conclude The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
merger, for example, did not receive final regulatory approval
from the Commission until fifteen months after the parties filed
their application." MCI and WorldCom filed their petitions for
review with the Commission on October 1, 1997, and the Com-
mission did not give its approval until September 14, 1998. The
Commission took eight months to approve the union of SBC and
Southern New England Telecommunications.11
No merging company should be subject to such long delays;
but it is especially troublesome for telecommunications carriers to
8 See Thomas A. Swett, Comment, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying
a Liquidated Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U Colo L Rev 341, 371
(1999).
9 Erin M. Reilly, The Telecommunications Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2
Commlaw Conspectus 95, 108 (1994). As FCC Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth has pointed
out, "[tihe FCC seems always to be last among countless agencies to offer an opinion."
Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth in Applications for Consent
to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Southern New
England Telecommunications Corp, Transferor, to SBC Communications Inc, Transferee,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rec 21292, 21322 (1998) ("SNETISBC"); see
also Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth in Application of
WorldCom, Inc and MCI Communications Corp for Transfer of Control of MCI Communi-
cations Corp to WorldCom, Inc, 13 FCC Rec 18025, 18158 (1998) ("MCI/WorldCom"). In
addition to FCC and DOJ review, merging telecommunications companies must also seek
approval from relevant state agencies.
The FCC has recently taken steps in an effort to streamline its review of mergers.
See Issues Memorandum for March 1, 2000 Transaction Team Public Forum on Stream-
lining FCC Review of Applications Relating to Mergers, <http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/
issuesmemo.html> (visited Oct 23, 2000). However, even under the Commission's pro-
posed timeline, the Commission would still need six months to resolve "complex mergers."
See Proposed Timeline for Consideration of Applications Relating to Complex Mergers,
<http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/timeline.html> (visited Oct 23, 2000). The Commission's
Chairman recently testified before Congress that a House bill, which requires final agency
action within sixty or ninety days from the filing of an application, does not allow enough
time for final agency action. See Statement of William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission before the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection on the Telecommunications
Merger Review Act of 2000 (Mar 14, 2000), <http://infoserver.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
Statements/2000/stwek021.html> (visited Oct 23, 2000).
10 Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Merger Gets Go-Ahead Clearance from FCC, Wireless Mes-
saging Rep 16 (Aug 19, 1997).
11 These long delays have prompted both Houses of Congress to consider legislation
that would limit the amount of time during which the FCC could review a merger. See
Antitrust Merger Review Act, S 467 § 2(b)(1)-(2) 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 25, 1999) in
145 Cong Rec S2432-34 (Mar 8, 1999); Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 2000,
HR 4019 § 3(a)(1) 106th Cong, 2d Sess (Mar 16, 2000), available on Westlaw at 1999 Cong
US HR 4019. The Senate bill was reported to the full Senate by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary without a written report and has been placed on the Senate Legislative
Calendar. See 145 Cong Rec S8084 (July 1, 1999). The House version has been approved
by a voice vote of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protec-
tion of the House Committee on Commerce. See Bill To Restrict FCC's Oversight of Merg-
ers Advances in House, CQ Weekly 1617 (July 1, 2000).
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experience an extensive lag time before their application is
cleared. Telecommunications is a dynamic industry where firms
can extract enormous profits from being the first-mover in a par-
ticular segment of the industry and establishing themselves as
the leading provider of a particular service. Congress expected,
moreover, the convergence of technology and therefore of tele-
communications companies. Congress passed the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 to promote competition in local markets and
to encourage a meeting of technologies that would provide con-
sumers with an array of telecommunications options. Thus, Con-
gress eliminated most line-of-business restrictions that were im-
posed when the Bell system was broken up in 1982.1 The 1996
Act "envisions a world in which all segments of the electronic
communications industries are open to competition ... and in-
deed converge and blur recognition." 3
Why, then, in this of all industries would Congress impose a
regime that leads to long delays that risk undermining the very
reasons for a merger? One possible answer is that the two agen-
cies reviewing mergers possess expertise in separate areas and
thus review the mergers with different policy goals in mind. As
Joel Klein, the former chief of DOJ's Antitrust Division, has ob-
served, "while the Justice Department and the Commission have
shared jurisdiction in this area, our statutory responsibilities and
missions are somewhat different."'4 To be sure, as discussed in
12 In 1982, an antitrust consent decree (known as the "Modified Final Judgment" or
"MFJ") signaled the end of the Bell System monopoly. See United States v AT&T, 552 F
Supp 131 (D DC 1982), affd as Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983). The decree
dissected the company's two major components, local exchange service and long distance
service. The former became the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs or
BOCs) and the latter AT&T. The RBOCs were viewed as natural monopolies, so the archi-
tects of the decree imposed line-of-business restrictions on the newly-formed companies to
prevent the reemergence of a company that would have "both the ability and the incen-
tive' to thwart competition" in a competitive market by leveraging its monopoly power in
the local exchange market. Id at 187 (citation omitted). Judge Harold Greene, who pre-
sided over the Modified Final Judgment, forbade the RBOCs from providing long-distance
service (also known as interexchange service), supplying information services, and manu-
facturing telecommunications and customer premises equipment. Id at 188-91. Congress
rejected this paradigm with the 1996 Act and eliminated the quarantines that prevented
convergence. See, for example, S Rep No 104-23, 104th Cong 1st Sess at 5-6 (1995) (not-
ing, among other things, that the 1996 Act "reforms the regulatory process to allow compe-
tition for local telephone service by cable, wireless, long distance and satellite companies,
and electric utilities, as well as other entities," "permits telephone companies to enter
cable," and "establishes a process under which the BOCs may apply to enter the inter-
LATA market").
13 Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 Colum L Rev 1323, 1405 (1998).
14 Joel I. Klein, Address to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Making the
Transition from Regulation to Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During the
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greater detail below, 5 the FCC frequently uses merger reviews as
forums for advancing its regulatory agenda under the Communi-
cations Act. The Department, in contrast, tends to see its role as
more limited: it is an antitrust enforcement agency without the
same type of substantive agenda." Thus, to the extent that the
two agencies serve different and socially valuable policing func-
tions, the negative consequences of dual review may be justified.
It is far from clear, however, that the agencies themselves be-
lieve that they are serving different purposes. Despite the differ-
ent statutory mandates, the agencies' respective analyses overlap
substantially. Both agencies focus on what they believe to be the
competitive effects of a merger. Specifically, the Commission be-
lieves that the public interest is served by promoting
competition." To that end, the Commission even borrows from
the Department's merger guidelines in conducting its analysis. 8
Indeed, the Commission will consider, as part of its Communica-
tions Act review, "whether the transfer may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly"' 9-the hallmark stan-
dard from the Clayton Act. Thus, while it might make sense to
give the FCC authority to analyze a transaction for its effect on
telecommunications policy, it is far from clear why the FCC
should have the power to conduct a competitive effects analysis
when the Department is already charged with the same task.2"
Process of Electric Power Restructuring (Jan 21, 1998), available online at <http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/publicspeeches/1332.pdf> (visited Oct 6, 2000).
15 See Part III C 1.
16 Effects of Consolidation on the State of Competition in the Telecommunications
Industry, Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, HR Rep No 105-118,
105th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1998) (statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, DOJ). The statement is also available at 1998 WL 12761639 (June 24,
1998).
17 See Applications of NYNEX Corp and Bell Atlantic Corp for Consent to Transfer
Control of NYNEX Corp, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rec 19985, 19987 2
(1997) ("BA/NYNEX").
18 See id at 20008 37.
19 Applications of AirTouch Communications, Inc and Vodafone Group, PLC for Con-
sent to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rec 9430, 9435-36
111 (1999) ("AirTouch / Vodafone").
20 It may be, in fact, that the Commission does not have its claimed authority under
the Communications Act. The Commission asserts that its authority to review mergers
qua mergers derives from §§ 214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act. See id. These
provisions address license transfers and license acquisitions, not mergers. There is noth-
ing in the language of either provision to suggest that the Commission may use these
statutory wedges to review the entire transaction between parties above and beyond the
particular lines being acquired and the particular station licenses being transferred. The
express authority Congress vested in the Commission to review mergers under the Clay-
ton Act casts further doubt on the Commission's reading. Under existing law, the Com-
mission has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Justice under §§ 7 and 11 of
[2000:
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This dual review is especially dubious when it appears that the
agencies seem to act at cross-purposes.2 As we discuss in the fol-
lowing two sections, the Commission seems to believe that com-
petition is best promoted through regulatory oversight, whereas
the Department tends to trust market forces to bring about the
optimum outcome.
B. DOJ Merger Review
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice operates
under antitrust laws that are, in many ways, paradigms of the
common-law adjudication model. When Senator Sherman de-
scribed the bill that became the Sherman Act, he explained that
the bill
the Clayton Act to disapprove acquisitions of 'common carriers engaged in wire or radio
communications or radio transmission of energy" where "in any line of commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 USC
§§ 18, 21(a) (1994 & Supp 1998). If the FCC possesses broad authority to review mergers
for their competitive effects under the Communications Act, there would seem to be lit-
tle-if any-need for this Clayton Act authority. The Commission's interpretation of its
authority under the Communications Act, then, renders its power under the Clayton Act
meaningless: the Clayton Act gives it no authority that it does not already possess under
the Communications Act and its broader "public interest" test. It is, of course, an estab-
lished interpretive canon that a reading of a statute that renders another statutory provi-
sion meaningless should be avoided. See, for example, Ratzlaf v United States, 510 US
135, 140-41 (1994).
. At least one member of the current Commission believes that the Commission's
broad review of mergers is an unauthorized power grab. See Separate Statement of Com-
missioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth in SNETISBC, 13 FCC Rec at 21322 & n 137. See also
Letter from Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth to Edward E. Whitacre, Jr., Apr 5, 1999
("Furchtgott/Whitacre Letter") [on file with U Chi Legal F] at 2 ("[We cannot impose new
substantive burdens on companies simply in the name of 'competition'; rather, we should
be able to point to a section of the Act indicating that Congress at least envisioned the
imposition of the duties at issue."). Another commissioner has expressed doubt about
whether the "marginal value of full-blown merger review by the Commission is justified by
its cost in time and resources." Telecommunications Reports 27 (May 31, 1999) (quoting
Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
These criticisms have not gone unnoticed; as discussed in note 11, Congress is con-
sidering legislation aimed at curbing the Commission's claimed authority. Whatever the
ultimate fate of the Commission's authority to review mergers, its past practice enables us
to compare two general approaches to mergers, the FCC's and DOJ's.
21 A recent report by the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (a
bipartisan panel of former regulators, academics, and representatives of industry and
labor) concludes that the "overlapping review in the United States is more often than not a
defect of the U.S. system and that a more rationale or sensible system would be to give
exclusive jurisdiction to determine competition policy and the competitive consequences of
mergers in federally regulated industries to DOJ and FTC." International Competition
Policy Advisory Committee, Multijurisdictional Mergers: Rationalizing the Merger Review
Process Through Targeted Reform (2000), <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpactchapter3.htm>
(visited May 7, 2000). See also James V. Grimaldi, Antitrust Review Changes Urged, Wash
Post E3 (Feb 29, 2000).
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[did] not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor,
the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only
to prevent and control combinations made with a view to
prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to in-
crease the profits of the producer at the cost of the con-
sumer. It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules
of the common law and human experience that is aimed at
by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.22
But because "it is difficult to define in legal language the precise
line between lawful and unlawful combinations,"23 the Sherman
Act left it to DOJ and the courts to wrestle with the facts of par-
ticular cases and to develop a common law of antitrust law. The
Clayton Act contains a similarly wide-open standard for the De-
partment and courts to apply: they are to determine whether a
merger's effect "may be substantially to lessen competition."24
Congress had a guiding principle in mind: competition is the
paramount objective and government should interfere when nec-
essary to further that objective. As one observer has put it, Con-
gress passed the antitrust laws with the belief that
[tihe government's natural role in the system of free pri-
vate enterprise was that of a patrolman policing the high-
ways of commerce. It is the duty of the modern patrolman
to keep the road open for all and everyone and to prevent
highway robbery, speeding, the running of red lights and
other violations that will endanger and hence, in the end,
slow down the overall movement of traffic. ... Govern-
ment intervention should remove obstacles to the free flow
of commerce, not itself become an additional obstacle.25
A former chief of the Antitrust Division reiterates that objective
by likening the Department's role to a referee: "If you don't let the
players play-or, in market terms, if you try to over-regulate the
22 21 Cong Rec 2457 (Mar 21, 1890) (statement of Senator Sherman).
23 Id.
24 15 USC § 18 (1994).
25 Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 226-27 (Johns Hopkins 1954). See
also Joel I. Klein, Address to the New York State Bar Association: The Importance of Anti-
trust Enforcement in the New Economy 12 (Jan 29, 1998), available online at
<httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/speechklein.htm> (visited Jan 22, 2000),
quoting Thurman Arnold, head of DOJ's Antitrust Division from 1939-43 ("The mainte-
nance of a free market is as much a matter of constant policing as the flow of traffic on a
busy intersection. It does not stay orderly by trusting the good intentions of drivers or by
preaching to them. It is a simple problem of policing, but a continuous one.").
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competitive process-you can ruin the game."26 The role of the
Department27 is therefore to interfere only as is necessary to keep
markets free and competitive.28
It is within this framework that the Department of Justice
evaluates telecommunications mergers. The Department ana-
lyzes telecommunications mergers as it does most mergers: under
§ 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits acquisitions "where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce ... in any
section of the country the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."29 Enforcement under the Clayton Act, by its terms, is
prospective and predictive: it is concerned with competitive ef-
fects that may occur, and it allows the Department to challenge a
merger before it is consummated."
In large transactions, which include most telecommunica-
tions mergers, the parties must file for pre-approval with the De-
partment under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976.31 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires the parties to
file "documentary material and information relevant to a pro-
posed acquisition as is necessary and appropriate to enable the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Assistant Attorney
General to determine whether such an acquisition may, if con-
summated, violate the antitrust laws."32 Parties must then wait a
certain specified period before the deal may be consummated.
During this waiting period, the Department investigates the
26 Klein, Importance of Antitrust Enforcement at 12 (cited in note 25).
27 This same objective would apply to other agencies that have enforcement authority
under the Clayton Act.
28 See Irwin M. Stelzer, Why Janet Reno v. Bill Gates is Good for Capitalism, The
Weekly Standard 25 (Dec 1 1997) ("Friends of the free market should not forget that the
antitrust laws deserve their veneration because they keep government's role as a regula-
tor to a bare minimum.").
29 15 USC § 18. The Department also has at its disposal §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, which, respectively, prohibit combinations in restraint of trade and actual or at-
tempted monopolization. See 15 USC §§ 1, 2, 18 (1994 & Supp 1998). See also United
States v Penn-Olin Chemical Co, 378 US 158, 170-71 (1964); ABA Antitrust Section, Anti-
trust Law Developments 275-76 n 4 (3d ed 1992). Professor Areeda has noted that "it
would be surprising, to say the least, to find that the Sherman Act prohibits a merger
whose effects are insufficient to satisfy the Clayton Act." Philip Areeda and Donald F.
Turner, 5 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
I 1145b at 257 (Little, Brown 1980).
30 Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 7 (cited in note 14)
("For the most part, merger enforcement under the Clayton Act is prospective: that is to
say, we generally challenge mergers before they are consummated.").
31 Pub L No 94-435, Title II, § 201, 90 Stat 1390 (1976), codified at 15 USC § 18(a).
32 15 USC § 18(a)(d)(1).
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merger. If necessary, the Department will reach a remedial
agreement with the parties, or file suit to block the merger.33
Because Congress believed that government should interfere
only when necessary to protect competition, the presumptions in
the Clayton Act favor the free market. That is, a transaction may
go forward unless the Department establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the Clayton Act standard is satisfied.
The Department must satisfy a district court that it has met its
burden with evidence admissible in a court of law.34
When the Department proceeds under § 7, it is concerned
withzprobabilities-not certainties or "ephemeral possibilities."35
In determining the probable effects of a merger, the Department
first defines the relevant product and geographic markets,36 and
then evaluates the impact of the acquisition on competition in
those markets.37 In determining whether a particular merger
violates the antitrust laws, the Department follows the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to analyze horizontal mergers"
and the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines to evaluate
non-horizontal mergers. 9 Although the Guidelines do not contain
33 Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 7 (cited in note 14).
34 See United States v Baker Hughes, Inc, 908 F2d 981, 983 (DC Cir 1990) (Thomas)
("[Tihe ultimate burden of persuasion ... remains with the government at all times.").
35 See Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 323 (1962) ("Congress used the
words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' to indicate that its concern was with
probabilities, not certainties. Statutes existed for dealing with clear-cut menaces to com-
petition; no statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers with a
possible anticompetitive effect were proscribed by this Act.") (citation omitted).
36 See ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments at 282-98 (cited in note
29).
37 Id at 298-99.
38 The basic analysis of horizontal mergers under the 1992 Guidelines is as follows:
First, the Agency assesses whether the merger would significantly in-
crease concentration and result in a concentrated market, properly de-
fined and measured. Second, the Agency assesses whether the merger, in
light of market concentration and other factors that characterize the
market, raises concern about potential adverse competitive effects. Third,
the Agency assesses whether entry would be timely, likely and sufficient
either to deter or to counteract the competitive effects of concern. Fourth,
the Agency assesses any efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be
achieved by the parties through other means. Finally the Agency assesses
whether, but for the merger, either party to the transaction would be
likely to fail.
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission,
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed Reg 41552 § 0.2 (1992), rev 4 Trade Reg Rep
§ 13104 (1997) ("Horizontal Merger Guidelines").
39 The Department is unlikely to challenge vertical mergers under the 1984 Guide-
lines unless the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (computed by summing the squares of the
market shares of every firm in the market) in the upstream market is more than 1800 and
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hard-and-fast rules, they do provide various tests and presump-
tive thresholds that inform the merging parties in advance what
factors are critical to the Department's analysis. The Department
is concerned with factors such as market concentration, ease of
entry, and potential efficiencies.4 °
The Department tends not to make new policies in the course
of its enforcement adjudications.4 Rather, the Department judges
each merger "on its own particular facts," applying principles of
competition that have already been announced. Parties, then,
have some ex ante guidance on which aspects of their transaction
will concern the Department.
Generally, the Department's approach to remedies is simi-
larly predictable. If the Department believes that a merger will
substantially lessen competition, it typically seeks to negotiate a
consent agreement with the parties.43 The purpose of a decree "is
to restore the market to roughly the competitive posture it would
have had but for the merger."44 Usually, the decrees are struc-
tural, requiring divestiture of assets, not regulation of day-to-day
operations.4"
For example, the Department reached a consent agreement
with SBC and Ameritech that required the companies to divest
certain cellular assets in areas in which the companies had over-
lapping cellular wireless licenses.4" Otherwise, the Department
gave the SBC/Ameritech merger full clearance. To take another
"a large percentage of the upstream market would be sold through vertically-integrated
retail outlets after the merger." United States Dept of Justice Antitrust Division and Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed Reg 26824 § 4.221 (1984), rev, 2
Trade Reg Rep 4490 (1986).
40 HR Rep No 105-118 at 9 (statement of Joel Klein) (cited in note 16).
41 This is not, of course, true in every case. A previous chief of the Antitrust Division
has noted that the Department seeks to clarify its views "through a variety of vehicles: in
speeches, in formal guidelines, in competitive impact statements, and in court filings."
Klein, Importance of Antitrust Enforcement at 7 (cited in note 25). He further added that
he was especially interested in "re-engaging the federal courts" "in pursuing new doctrinal
issues." Id.
42 HR Rep No 105-118 at 8 (statement of Joel Klein) (cited in note 16).
43 If the Department pursues this option, it first publishes a Competitive Impact
Statement, which explains the merger's allegedly anticompetitive effects. The Statement
also describes how the proposed consent decree would remedy those effects. The Depart-
ment opens up the Statement to comment, and if necessary, has hearings before a court.
The decree is then entered when a court concludes that the decree is in the public interest.
See 15 USC § 5 (1994); Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 8
(cited in note 14).
44 Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 8 (cited in note 14).
45 Id.
46 See United States v SBC Communications Inc, 1999 US Dist Lexis 16789, *9-11 (D
DC).
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example, the Department approved the Bell Atlantic union with
NYNEX with no strings attached. After "a year-long analysis of
millions of documents-including, significantly, the non-public
business plans of many of the affected players-as well as lots of
deposition testimony, interviews, expert commentary, and ad-
vice," the Department did not challenge the merger.47 Thus, "even
though it was one of the largest mergers in our Nation's history,"
the Department did not let size alone sway its determination.48
Rather, the Department relied on the fact that the merger "was
likely to benefit consumers in that the resulting efficiencies would
lead to improved services.""9 As discussed in the next section, the
FCC found both of these unions much more troublesome under its
view of their "competitive effects."
C. FCC Merger Review
The Commission is perhaps the paradigmatic New Deal
agency.5" It addresses perceived problems with a broad brush,
generally passing sweeping regulations to govern every last an-
ticipated problem. When additional problems arise, it begins pro-
cedures to pass additional regulations, and so on.
The Commission's authority is not limited to rulemakings,
however. Like the Department, it has adjudicatory powers.5' In
particular, the Commission holds court over wireless and wireline
licenses. Their issuance, renewal, and transfer is governed by the
broad "public interest" standard-a paradigmatic common-law
benchmark designed to allow the agency to proceed on a case-by-
case basis. The Commission's review of mergers takes place
within license adjudications and under the public interest stan-
dard. As we discuss in more detail, the Commission's substantive
review of mergers is far different from DOJ's.
47 Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 5 (cited in note 14).
48 Klein, Importance of Antitrust Enforcement at 13 (cited in note 25).
49 Id at 13-14.
60 See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints of
Agency Discretion, 51 Admin L Rev 429, 433-34 (1999) ("Broad statutory delegations of
power to an agency to regulate a general area of the economy, characteristic of much leg-
islation adopted under the New Deal belief in agency expertise, impose few ex ante con-
straints on the agency.").
51 The FCC reviews mergers in licensing proceedings, which the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA") includes under the adjudicatory rubric. The APA defines "adjudication"
as "agency process for the formulation of an order." 5 USC § 551(7) (1994). Under the APA,
'order" includes "licensing." Id at § 551(6). As we discuss, however, the Commission's
licensing proceedings in the merger context bear a striking resemblance to rulemakings in
many instances.
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1. The Commission's authority under the Clayton Act.
Under existing law, the Commission has concurrent jurisdic-
tion with DOJ under Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act to dis-
approve acquisitions of "common carriers engaged in wire or radio
communications or radio transmission' of energy" where "in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."52 In
practice, however, the FCC consistently declines to proceed under
its Clayton Act authority. 3 In reviewing mergers, the Commis-
sion invariably notes this authority, then states that it need not
rely upon the Clayton Act because the Commission's review un-
der the Communications Act is sufficient. 4
It is easy to see why the Commission prefers reviewing merg-
ers under the Communications Act. As discussed in greater detail
below, the "public interest" standard gives it virtually limitless
discretion to approve, disapprove, or condition a merger based on
whatever factors it deems important at the time. Pursuant to this
broad power, the Commission can disapprove or place conditions
on a merger even if the Department of Justice has already
cleared the transaction outright. And, under the Communications
Act, the merging parties bear the burden of demonstrating that
the license transfer is in the public interest. The Commission it-
self determines whether that burden has been satisfied, relying
on any evidence in the public record. A reviewing court will up-
hold the Commission's factual findings as long as they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence--a notoriously lax standard.55 In
52 15 USC §§ 18, 21(a).
53 Weiss and Stern, 6 Commlaw Conspectus at 198 (cited in note 1) ("[W]e have not
found a case in the last forty years where the Commission proceeded under the Clayton
Act.").
54 See, for example, MCI/WorldCom, 13 FCC Rec at 18032-33 12; The Merger of
MCI Communications Corp and British Telecommunications plc, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 12 FCC Rec 15351, 15359 28 (1997) ("BTIMCI IF'); BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec
at 20006 35; Application of Pacific Telesis Group and SBC Communications, Inc, for
Consent to Transfer Control of Pacific Telesis Group, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
FCC Rec 2624, 2631 13 (1997) ("SBC/PacTel"); AirTouch! Vodafone, 14 FCC Rec at 9434
n 21 (refusing "to exercise its statutory authority under the Clayton Act in this case be-
cause the Commission's jurisdiction under the Communications Act is sufficient to address
all questions regarding the competitive effects of the proposed transfer, including the issue
of whether the transfer may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly"). The D.C. Circuit has held that the FCC has discretion whether to assert its Clayton
Act authority. See United States v FCC, 652 F2d 72, 82-83 (DC Cir 1980).
55 See, for example, Consolo v Federal Maritime Commission, 383 US 607, 620 (1966)
("This standard is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
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contrast, the Commission would bear the burden of proving an
antitrust violation under the Clayton Act and would have to rely
upon evidence admissible in a court of law.56 Thus, the Commis-
sion has considerably more procedural and substantive flexibility
when it operates under the Communications Act instead of the
Clayton Act.
2. The Commission's review under
the public interest standard.
The two critical license provisions in the Communications
Act that apply to telecommunications mergers are §§ 214(a) and
310(d). The benchmark in § 214(a) for license transfers and ac-
quisitions is "the present or future public convenience and neces-
sity."" The test in § 310(d) is the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity."58 The "public interest"59 is, to put it mildly, an
amorphous standard that allows the Commission to consider vir-
tually anything.6" As the Supreme Court has said, the "standard
no doubt leaves wide discretion and calls for imaginative inter-
pretation."6 It is "[n]ot a standard that lends itself to application
with exactitude."" And, for its part, the Commission has done
little to rein itself in.63 Over the years, the Commission has im-
drawing inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence."); see also id at 619-21
(elaborating on this standard).
56 A former chief of the Antitrust Division recently suggested amending the Clayton
Act to place the burden on merging parties in situations where markets are making the
transition from regulation to competition. See Klein, Making the Transition from Regula-
tion to Competition at 13 (cited in note 14) ("The basic notion behind this approach is that
any uncertainties associated with the transition period should not provide a legal license
to merge but rather may be a good reason for increased skepticism about certain combina-
tions.").
57 47 USC § 214(a) (1994).
58 47 USC § 310(d) (1994).
59 Although the language employed in §§ 214(a) and 310(d) is not identical, the Su-
preme Court has stated that "[t]he phrase 'public convenience and necessity' no less than
the phrase 'public interest' must be given a scope consistent with the broad purpose" of the
statute of which it is a part. Interstate Commerce Commission v Railway Labor Executives
Association, 315 US 373, 376 (1942). Thus, we use the term "public interest" as a short-
hand for both standards.
60 As Judge Friendly has observed, it "[clertainly would be better if Congress could be
somewhat more specific at the outset." Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards 13 (Harvard 1962).
61 FCC v RCA Communications, Inc, 346 US 86, 90 (1953).
62 Id.
63 Mike Harrington, A-B-C, See You Real Soon: Broadcast Media Mergers and Ensur-
ing a "Diversity of Voices," 38 BC L Rev 497, 506 (1997) (pointing out that the Commission
"has consistently rejected calls to adopt concrete standards for defining the public inter-
est").
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bued the term with a variety of factors for consideration-basi-
cally, whatever the Commission deems important at the time.?4
Vague though it may be, the Supreme Court has upheld the
"public interest" standard outside of the merger review context
and allowed the Commission broad leeway under which to oper-
ate.65 A Commission decision that a license transfer is in the pub-
lic interest is entitled to "substantial judicial deference."ss "So
long as 'the FCC's action resulted from consideration of the rele-
vant factors' and the agency has not 'succumbed to a clear error of
judgment,' its decision must be upheld."67
The latest incarnation of the Commission's public interest
test under Sections 214 and 310 focuses on what the Commission
believes to be "competitive effects." The Commission considered
the competitive implications of a merger as a factor in the public
interest inquiry long before the 1996 Act.68 However, since the
64 As Judge Friendly observed, the FCC uses "an arbitrary set of criteria whose appli-
cation ... is shaped to suit the cases of the moment." Friendly, Federal Administrative
Agencies at 54 (cited in note 60). For example, in the broadcast license context, the Com-
mission has considered local ownership, diversity of ownership, proposed programming,
broadcast experience, the character and financial status of the applicants, and whether
there would be a concentration of media control. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its
Reform 73, 78-79 (Harvard 1982); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and Adju-
dication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv L Rev 921, 943 (1965) (not-
ing that the FCC, among other agencies, has "often" failed to use regulations "to clarify
[its] view on the significance of competitive or other key factors in the performance of their
functions").
65 See FCC v RCA Communications, Inc, 346 US at 91 ("Congress has charged the
courts with the responsibility of saying whether the Commission has fairly exercised its
discretion within the vague, penumbral bounds expressed by the standard of 'public inter-
est'"); Rainbow Broadcasting Co v FCC, 949 F2d 405, 410 (DC Cir 1991) ("[T]he Supreme
Court has validated the broad parameters within which the FCC may further its view of
the public interest without interference from the courts. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress delegated to the FCC the task of making the initial determination of how its
policies may best serve the public.").
66 FCC v WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 US 582, 596 (1981).
67 SBC Communications Inc v FCC, 56 F3d 1484, 1490 (DC Cir 1995).
68 See, for example, Craig 0. McCaw & AT&T, Application for Consent to the Transfer
of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rec 5836, 5849 91 20 (1994), reconsid-
eration denied on other grounds, 10 FCC Rec 11786 (1995), affd as SBC Communications
Inc v FCC, 56 F3d 1484 (DC Cir 1995); South Central Bell Phone Co and Southern Bell Co,
Application To Merge, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rec 7136 91 13, 7138 18
(1991) (conditioning its finding that the acquisition is in the public interest on, among
other things, the promotion of "competition"); The Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Co, Northwestern Bell Telephone Co, and Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rec 1982 (1990) (same); Application of GTE to
Acquire Control of Telnet Corp, 72 FCC2d 11, 135-49 (1979); Monitoring Compliance With
Conditions Underlying GTE Corp's Acquisition of Telnet, Further Order, 85 FCC Rep 409,
410 1 5 (1981) (requesting public comment on the appropriate degree of market concentra-
tion in the data service industry); Monitoring Compliance With Conditions Underlying
GTE Corp's Acquisition of Telnet, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 FCC2d 215 (1982)
(applying same); see also Jason E. Friedrich, Thinkable Mergers: The FCC's Evolving
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Act's passage, the Commission focuses almost exclusively on
competition in conducting its public interest review. 9 In the wake
of the 1996 Act, the Commission announced a "framework" for
analyzing whether a license transfer will be in the public interest.
In its order conditionally approving the merger of Bell Atlantic
and NYNEX, the Commission announced that merging parties
bear the burden of establishing that the merger's procompetitive
effects will outweigh its anticompetitive effects.7" The Commis-
sion assesses whether a merger is "likely" to result in harmful or
beneficial effects on competition in any affected market.71 Its "as-
sessment takes into account any procompetitive commitments
made by the parties."72 The Commission also considers "merger-
specific efficiencies, such as cost reductions, productivity en-
hancements, or improved incentives for innovation" and whether
the merger "will support the general policies of opening markets
and lowering entry barriers that underlie the 1996 Act."73
To conduct this inquiry, the Commission's analysis follows a
series of steps, many of which mimic those taken by the Depart-
ment of Justice in its review under the Clayton Act. For example,
the Commission begins its inquiry by first defining the relevant
product and geographic markets.74 Second, the Commission iden-
tifies "the current and potential participants in each relevant
market, especially those that are likely to have a significant com-
petitive effect." 5 Third, the Commission evaluates the merger's
effects on competition in the relevant markets.7" Fourth, the
Public Interest Standard, 6 Commlaw Conspectus 261, 265-66 (1998) (describing the
Commission's increasing tendency to apply a procompetitive public interest standard in
non-merger contexts); id at 266 ("For decades, competition was only one of the things on a
long list of considerations that the Commission considered."). As the telecommunications
industry developed, the focus of the Commission's public interest standard was increas-
ingly "to promote competition." William H. Read and Ronald A. Weiner, FCC Reform:
Governing Requires a New Standard, 49 Fed Comm L J 289, 301-02 (1997) (pointing out
that the Commission began to consider efficiency and competition concerns in its decisions
opening the telephone equipment and long distance markets to new entrants).
69 See BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 19987 2 ("In order to find that a merger is in the
public interest, we must, for example, be convinced that it will enhance competition.").
70 Id at 20008-09 37. The Commission approved other mergers immediately after
the 1996 Act and before BA/NYNEX, but BA/NYNEX signaled a fundamental shift in its
review. Compare id with SBCIPacTel, 12 FCC Rec at 2626-27 2 ("A demonstration that
benefits will arise from the transfer is not, however, a prerequisite to our approval, pro-
vided that no foreseeable adverse consequences will result from the transfer.").
71 See BT/MCI 11, 12 FCC Rec at 15371 41.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id at 15357-58 91 11.
75 BT/MCIII, 12 FCC Rec at 15357-58 T1 11.
76 Id.
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Commission analyzes whether the merger will result in "merger-
specific efficiencies, such as cost reductions, productivity en-
hancements, or improved incentives for innovation.""v The last
two steps are taken directly from the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines issued by the Department of Justice and the FTC.7"
Despite this similarity, the Commission does not strictly ad-
here to DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines or to traditional anti-
trust analysis. In fact, the Commission's "competitive effects" ru-
bric covers an area exceedingly broader than anything the De-
partment analyzes. Thus, although the Commission claims that
its public interest inquiry is "informed by antitrust principles," it
hastens to add that "it is not governed by the scope of the anti-
trust laws."79 In the Commission's view, "[t]he competitive analy-
sis applied under the public interest standard is necessarily
broader than the standard applied to ascertain violations of the
antitrust laws.""
One critical respect in which the Commission's competitive
effects analysis is broader than the Department's is the Commis-
sion's focus on potential competition. In its order approving the
merger of MCI and WorldCom, the Commission explained that it
interprets the 1996 Act-which establishes a clear national policy
of "competition leading to deregulation, rather than continued
regulation of dominant firms"-as requiring it to focus on the
merger's effect on future competition.8' Because antitrust agen-
cies such as DOJ "are required to approve mergers unless they
substantially lessen competition," the Commission reasons that
"it is possible that the antitrust agencies might well approve a
merger that does not decrease the current level of competition but
that does impede the development of future competition." 2 Thus,
the Commission insists on conducting its own review of the com-
petitive effects of a transaction, with a focus on threats to poten-
tial rather than actual competition. Chairman Kennard recently
77 Id.
78 For a discussion of how the Commission applies its analytical framework, see Peter
W. Huber, Michael K Kellogg, and John Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law § 7.5.4
(Aspen 2d ed 1999).
79 Applications of Teleport Communications Group Inc and AT&T for Consent to
Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Point-to-Point Microwave Licenses and Authori-
zations to Provide International Facilities-Based and Resold Communications Services,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rec 15236, 15243 12 (1998) ("Teleportl
AT&7") (citations omitted).
80 BTIMCI II, 12 FCC Rec at 15365-66 30 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
81 MCIlWorldCom, 13 FCC Rec 18034-35 14.
82 Id (emphasis added).
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reaffirmed the Commission's belief that "[a] particular transac-
tion that may not immediately lessen competition may have dra-
matic adverse consequences with respect to the future develop-
ment of the marketplace." 3 The Commission, then, will rely on its
ability to predict into the future to block or condition a merger
that is otherwise not harmful to actual competition.
The Commission's review also differs from the Department's
in that the Commission will consider how the merger will affect
its ability to regulate as a separate factor in determining whether
to approve the merger. Although one would not normally consider
this as part of a "competitive effects" analysis, the Commission
believes there is a direct link. 4 The Commission reasons as fol-
lows:
A reduction in the number of separately owned firms en-
gaged in similar businesses will likely reduce this Com-
mission's ability to identify, and therefore to contain, mar-
ket power. One way that this can happen is by reducing
the number of separately owned and operated carriers
that can act as "benchmarks" for evaluating the conduct of
other carriers or the industry as a whole. 8
The Commission has been particularly concerned with
benchmarking in mergers of incumbent local exchange carriers."
It views the "existence of several Bell companies as an important
regulatory tool,"87 and it is reluctant to lose this tool, even if it
means blocking or imposing conditions on a merger that is other-
wise not anticompetitive. For example, because of its "concerns
that the merger of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX will continue to re-
duce the diversity, and hence the quality, of comparisons of
regulatory and market performance between the Bell Compa-
nies," the Commission approved the merger subject to an exten-
83 SBC-Ameritech Merger Is Fair, Kennard Tells Congress, Telecommunications Re-
ports 27 (May 24, 1999), quoting letter from FCC Chairman William Kennard to Repre-
sentative John D. Dingell.
84 See BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec 20058-62 9T 147-56 (discussing the Commission's
ability to regulate under its analysis of"[o]ther competitive effects").
85 Id at 20058 1 147.
86 See, for example, id at 20058(a) 1 149 ("Each BOC serves as a benchmark against
which the Commission can measure the performance and behavior of the next; such com-
parisons were quite impossible to do before divestiture."); SNET/SBC, 13 FCC Rec 21302
121; Letter from William E. Kennard to Richard C. Notebaert and Edward E. Whitacre,
Jr. at 2, Apr 1, 1999 (regarding the merger of SBC and Ameritech) ("Kennard Letter") [on
file with U Chi Legal F].
87 BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 20058 1 148.
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sive array of conditions.88 The Commission reasoned that its con-
cerns regarding its ability to regulate were "not substantially
mitigated by the potential efficiencies the Applicants posit."89
The Commission repeated this worry in its order conditionally
approving the SBC/Ameritech merger. The Commission con-
cluded that "the proposed merger of SBC and Ameritech would
impede the ability of regulators and competitors to make effective
benchmark comparisons, which would force more intrusive, more
costly, and less effective regulatory measures."' Accordingly, the
Commission placed an even greater burden on the merging par-
ties to show "countervailing public interest benefits of this merger
significantly exceeding those from previous incumbent LEC [Lo-
cal Exchange Carrier] mergers in order to demonstrate that this
merger, on balance, serves the public interest."9'
The Commission's substantive analysis varies from that of the
Department in yet another respect: the Commission will take into
account how the merger might benefit or harm a particular group
of "underserved" customers. When companies do not offer service
to a particular area, it is generally because serving that area is
less profitable than providing service elsewhere. Because a com-
pany is not engaging in anticompetitive behavior by serving more
profitable customers, the antitrust laws do not concern them-
selves with this sort of economically rational behavior. As long as
the merger is not likely to substantially lessen competition in a
market, DOJ will not disapprove. The Commission, however,
analyzes whether the merger will affirmatively benefit what it
deems underserved groups, and if not, it will impose conditions to
provide those groups special protection. For example, in the SBC
and Ameritech merger, the Commission approved the merger
subject to a variety of conditions aimed at promoting advanced
services (such as high-speed internet access) to rural and urban
consumers and improving residential service for low-income cus-
tomers.92 These benefits to retail customers were the result of
88 Id at 20069 1 177.
89 Id.
90 Applications of Ameritech Corp and SBC Communications Inc, for Consent to
Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to
Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and
101 of the Commission's Rules ("SBC/Ameritech"), 14 FCC Rec 14712, 14762 1 104 (1999).
91 Id at 14794 185.
92 See id at 14866-67 376, 400-02.
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"long and detailed discussions with the Commission Staff,"9 3 who
obviously requested conditions that would benefit these particu-
lar groups.
As the Commission's broad analysis of what it deems the
"competitive effects" of a merger demonstrates, the Commission's
substantive analysis under the Communications Act is far less
restrained than it would be under the Clayton Act. And, in fact,
the Commission has left itself the ultimate loophole to decide
mergers as it sees fit: the Commission asserts that the public in-
terest test allows it to judge a merger based on its compatibility
with "the broad aims" of the 1934 and 1996 Acts.94 Broad indeed.
The Commission has noted that the Acts' goals include, "among
other things": furthering a "'procompetitive, de-regulatory na-
tional policy framework;"' advancing "the competition policies of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts;" promoting 'access to advanced
telecommunications and information services ... in all regions of
the Nation;' and assessing likely impacts on "the quality of tele-
communications services," including "the provision of new or ad-
ditional services to consumers."95 There is little that cannot be
linked in some respect to these purposes.
II. THE AGENCY MINDSET: THE SUBSTANTIVE INFLUENCE
As the preceding section made clear, DOJ and the FCC en-
gage in vastly different substantive evaluations of telecommuni-
cations mergers. Although they both claim to analyze competitive
effects, they give strikingly varying content to what that entails.
The Department follows a set of merger guidelines that directs
parties to the critical factors being analyzed-factors that repre-
sent the traditional antitrust concerns of market power, ease of
entry, efficiencies, and the like. The Commission, in contrast,
takes a much broader view and will judge a merger not merely
against the settled backdrop of antitrust concerns, but also based
on its compatibility with "the broad aims" of the 1934 and 1996
Acts-aims that allow the Commission to consider just about
anything in its review of mergers. And the Commission does not
indicate how it will balance each of the various factors and con-
cerns it considers.
93 See Letter from Richard Hetke, Ameritech Corporation, and Paul K. Mancini, SBC
Communications Inc, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, CC Dkt No 98-141 1 (filed
with FCC Aug 27, 1999) ("Hetke/Mancini Letter").
94 BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 20002 31.
95 Id (footnotes omitted).
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The agencies also differ in their treatment of competitively
neutral cases. The Commission will approve a merger only if it is
procompetitive-that is, if the parties can demonstrate that the
merger will affirmatively advance competition. If the merger is
competitively neutral (that is, if it will neither advance nor retard
competition), it would fail the Commission's stated test. In con-
trast, DOJ will not block such a transaction.96 In fact, the Clayton
Act demands that even transactions that lessen competition must
be permitted to go forward; they may be blocked only if the De-
partment proves that they may substantially lessen competition.
The short answer, then, to explain any difference in outcome
between the two agencies is that they do not, in fact, apply the
same substantive standard despite the claim by both that they
are focusing on competition. "Competitive effects" means different
things to each agency. The Department will consider various
market-based criteria that it has described in a series of guide-
lines. The Commission will consider virtually anything that
touches on its broad regulatory mandate. The Department's test
will permit competitively neutral transactions; the Commission's
test will block them. The Department bears the burden of proof
and gets no deference on its findings; the Commission places the
burden on the parties and is entitled to substantial deference in
its factual conclusions.
But to rely on these substantive differences alone to explain
the varying treatment of mergers, without probing any deeper, is
to ignore a much more complicated dynamic. Why does the Com-
mission explore so many additional factors in the name of pro-
moting competition-even when those factors seem to bear little
relationship to competition? Why does the Commission begin
from a presumption that a merger should be disapproved and
place the burden on the parties to prove otherwise? Why does the
Commission fail to enunciate clear guidelines that will allow par-
ties to predict the fate of their license reviews? Why does the
Commission proceed only under the Communications Act and
never the Clayton Act? It is only by seeking the answers to these
questions that we begin to understand the critical role of an
agency's view toward regulation.
96 See HR Rep No 105-118 at 10 (statement of Joel Klein) (cited in note 16) (noting
that the antitrust laws "strike the right balance in allowing [DOJ] to stay out of the way of
procompetitive or innocuous mergers, while giving us full authority to challenge anticom-
petitive mergers when we find them," and observing that the FCC requires that mergers
"enhance competition" while DOJ is concerned with mergers that "will substantially lessen
competition").
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The primary source of the agencies' substantive disagreement
is the different view each agency possesses regarding the appro-
priate role of an agency. This fundamental divergence in outlook
colors the inquiry of both agencies and leads to disparate results.
Indeed, the contrary underlying visions of lawmaking account for
the different content given to "competitive effects," the manner in
which competitively neutral transactions are treated, the oppo-
site burdens of proof, and the guidance the agencies provide the
parties.
A. DOJ: A Market-Based Preference
Because the Department does not regulate in a particular
substantive area, it generally does not use merger adjudications
as an opportunity to advance a particular social agenda. That is,
DOJ gauges a merger in relation to general competition princi-
ples as opposed to specific substantive policies. The Department
adheres to the simple prescript that the antitrust laws are de-
signed to promote competition, not particular competitors.97 The
Department follows a core policy to "prevent agreements or merg-
ers that create or increase market power, or unilateral actions
that use existing market power to protect or expand a
monopoly."98 The Department then applies that policy to the par-
ticular market and facts at issue, usually without seeking to in-
terfere beyond this basic principle. There are no additional social
policies that the Department's Antitrust Division regulates. For
example, it does not regulate the day-to-day operations of tele-
phone companies or electric utilities, nor does it establish the na-
tion's environmental policy or set consumer product safety stan-
dards. It simply applies the common-law-rooted antitrust laws to
myriad markets. And that approach generally gives the benefit of
the doubt to market forces.
B. The Commission's Bias Against Mergers
After an agency lifetime of regulating telecommunications
companies and imposing its own views of what is best for compe-
tition in that industry, the Commission has developed a bias
against letting the market determine what is- the optimal com-
petitive outcome. This disposition has infected the Commission's
outlook on a variety of matters, including its substantive merger
97 Klein, Importance of Antitrust Enforcement at 13 (cited in note 25).
98 Id at 15.
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policy and the procedural framework in which the Commission
chooses to operate. Thus, the Commission presumes competitive
danger if parties are allowed to combine freely in the marketplace
and places the burden on the merging parties to show otherwise.
The burden, moreover, is not simply to establish that the
merger will not "substantially lessen competition."99 Rather, the
Commission requires the parties to show that the merger will
affirmatively promote competition. °° The Commission takes this
tack despite the fact that the Commission has a powerful arsenal
to address any anticompetitive behavior in violation of its rules
that arises after the merger is consummated. For example, it has
the power to revoke licenses01 or to issue cease and desist
orders.0 2 Moreover, if its current rules are ineffective to govern a
particular practice that violates the Act, it can enact a rule of
general applicability to deal with the problem. Despite these op-
tions, the Commission prefers to rely on its predictive judgment
regarding potential competition instead of actual competitive re-
alities,0 3 and it takes a decidedly pessimistic view toward con-
solidation.
The Commission's eagerness to impose conditions on
mergers1 4 involving an entire array of new obligations on the
parties further reveals its regulatory bias. The Bell Atlan-
tic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech mergers illustrate how onerous
and rule-like the Commission's merger conditions can be.1"' Bell
99 15 USC § 18.
100 See, for example, BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 20002 31, 20007 36.
101 See 47 USC § 312(a) (1994 & Supp 1998). One reason the Commission may resist
revocation is that there is a presumption in favor of a license once it has been issued; the
burden of proof falls on the FCC to prove otherwise. 47 USC § 312(d) (1994 & Supp 1998).
102 47 USC § 312(b) (1994 & Supp 1998).
103 The Commission applies a variation of the "actual potential competition doctrine,"
which has been widely criticized for "involving courts in undue speculation and for de-
manding excessive speculation about the oligopoly market at issue". Philip Areeda and
Herbert Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Ap-
plication I 701(d) (Little, Brown rev ed 1996). Not only have many courts explicitly re-
served judgment on whether the doctrine is even valid under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
but Government attempts to invoke the doctrine have been unsuccessful. See Antitrust
Law Developments at 322-28 (collecting cases) (cited in note 29).
104 Section 214 authorizes the Commission to attach to wireline certificates "such
terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may re-
quire." 47 USC § 214(c) (1994 & Supp 1998). Section 303(r) likewise authorizes the Com-
mission to incorporate conditions in wireless licenses. It provides that "the Commission
from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall ... prescribe
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter." 47 USC § 303(r) (1994).
105 For a more detailed discussion of the conditions imposed in BA/NYNEX, see
Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law at § 7.5.4.7 (cited in note 78).
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Atlantic and NYNEX agreed to a multitude of conditions to sat-
isfy the Commission that their merger was in the public interest.
For instance, the parties had to provide detailed monitoring re-
ports-which include detailed data on ordering, repair and main-
tenance, network performance, and various other factors-to
competing carriers, state agencies, and the Commission. The
Commission further required the companies to provide elements
of their network to their competitors based on "forward looking
economic costs," despite the fact that the Eighth Circuit had re-
cently rejected such access.' s SBC and Ameritech agreed to con-
ditions that were even more sweeping after "[t]he Chairman
asked that Ameritech and SBC pursue discussions with the
Commission Staff to craft conditions" addressing his concerns
with the merger. SBC and Ameritech committed to "stringent
performance monitoring, auditing, and enforcement provisions
that go well beyond what the Commission has required of poten-
tial merger partners in the past."0 7 They pledged to expand into
thirty new markets or face more than a billion dollars in dam-
ages. The companies agreed to offer various discounts to their
competitors and to waive certain charges for residential custom-
ers. The companies also promised to provide advanced services
through a separate affiliate for at least three years. And the list
goes on.'
It should be noted that not all mergers face such extensive
conditions. Indeed, the SBC/Ameritech and Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
mergers involve perhaps the most extensive conditions imposed
on mergers since the 1996 Act. But that reflects the fact that in-
cumbent carriers such as SBC, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, and
NYNEX are generally regulated more heavily by the Commission
than other parties even outside the merger context. The Commis-
sion imposed the same proportional oversight on those parties
when they sought merger approval. In any event, the Commis-
sion has not hesitated to seek conditions from other merging par-
ties that are not as heavily regulated as incumbent local carriers.
In approving the AT&T/McCaw merger, for example, the Commis-
106 BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 19988 4, 19992 13.
107 Hetke/Mancini Letter (cited in note 93).
108 See SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14964, Appendix C for a list all of the condi-
tions. Bell Atlantic and GTE agreed to similar conditions to gain merger approval. See
Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corp, Transferee, For Consent to
Transfer Control of Domestic and International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and
Applications to Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable Landing License, CC Dkt No 98-
184, Appendix D (June 16, 2000), available online at <http://www.fcc.gov/Daily-Releases/
Daily/Business/2000/db0616/fccOO221.txt> (visited Oct 23, 2000) ("BA/GTE").
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sion required the companies to offer local cellular and long-distance
service on an unbundled basis."9 The Commission further ordered
AT&T to "not unreasonably discriminate" in McCaw's favor in the
development of proprietary technology or in the supply of cellular
equipment.u In analyzing the proposed transfer of stock between
BT and MCI, the Commission would have subjected British Tele-
com and MCI to various reporting requirements and insisted that
MCI offer some of its capacity on its route between the U.S. and
the U.K."' MCI/WorldCom also received conditional approval
from the Commission, including a requirement that MCI divest
its internet backbone assets prior to the merger."2
In sum, the Commission subjects numerous parties to detailed
regulatory requirements, mandating particular outcomes and
results, as conditions for gaining FCC merger approval."'
C. The Agencies' Antitrust Policies Compared
Although both the Department and the Commission have
years of experience making determinations about competition
and exercising authority over mergers, the FCC and DOJ have
emerged with polar opposite viewpoints. The Department typi-
cally interferes minimally and seeks to avoid command-and-
control remedies that involve extensive oversight. It generally
uses adjudications for the narrow purpose of enforcing the anti-
trust laws and avoids opening those procedures to broader social-
policy calls.
The FCC maintains a much broader view of what can-and
should-be accomplished in a merger proceeding. Historically,
the Commission has exercised almost total control over the na-
tion's telephone industry. Although the 1996 Act represents Con-
gress's desire to move telecommunications away from regulation
and toward free markets and competition,114 the agency's mindset
109 Craig 0. McCaw & AT&T, Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rec 5836, 5928 176 (1994). The companies also
agreed to abide by certain customary proprietary network information rules. Id at 5928-29
178.
110 Id at 5929 IT 182-84.
111 BT/MCI II, 12 FCC Rec at 15461-62 91 286, 15465-66 1 297.
112 MCII WorldCom, 13 FCC Rec at 18026-27 91 1.
113 "Customers and regulators can throw away their copies of the Communications Act
and the commission's regulations. The real rules are now in the FCC's orders approving
this particular transaction." Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, Wall St J A18 (Nov
5, 1999).
114 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, at Preamble,
codified at 47 USC §§ 151 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998). Although the Act removes many
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has not quite caught up with the changing regulatory world in
which it now exists. The Commission's practice with mergers
proves the point. Although DOJ gave the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
and SBC/Ameritech mergers the green light with few or no
strings attached,"' the Commission required the companies to
commit to a multitude of conditions. The Commission could not
resist the impulse in these merger review proceedings to take
control of the transactions and mold them to its liking.
Perhaps the most revealing illustration of the Commission's
regulation bias is the Commission's inclusion of its own ability to
regulate as one of the "competitive" factors it considers in evalu-
ating a license transfer. As noted above, the Commission ap-
proved the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech unions only
after imposing conditions to compensate for what the Commission
viewed as "the grave harms" the mergers "pose[d] to the regula-
tory processes. ""' The Commission claims-with little regard for
irony-that consolidation of the Bell companies eliminates com-
parative benchmarks," 7 which makes it more difficult for the
Commission to regulate, which in turn may "delay the transition
to competitive, deregulated telecommunications markets.""8 In
other words, the Commission believes that regulation is neces-
sary to bring about deregulation, and that a merger that is not
anticompetitive should be blocked solely because it might make
regulation more difficult."9 This type of logic is anathema to a
free market and deregulation. Yet this reasoning drives the
Commission's approach to mergers.
regulatory restrictions, it is not, strictly speaking, an example of pure "deregulation." The
1996 Act "contains over 100 pages of regulatory requirements, directs the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) to commence more than a dozen rulemaking proceedings,
and is being implemented through scores of arbitrations throughout the states, each of
which is subject to judicial review." Kearney and Merrill, 98 Colum L Rev at 1325 (cited in
note 13); see also HR Rep No 104-204, 104th Cong 1st sess 207 (1995) (additional views of
Reps Dingell, Tauzin, Boucher, and Stupak) (agreeing that the bill that became the 1996
Act is deregulatory in some respects but noting that it "imposes onerous regulations that
will delay and make extremely difficult Bell Company entry into new lines of business").
11r As noted in Part I B, the Department required divestiture of overlapping cellular
properties.
116 SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14794-95 $1 185.
117 The courts and the Merger Guidelines recognize benchmarks only in the commer-
cial sense-that is, whether the competitive "benchmarks" against which consumers may
make marketplace choices will be reduced by the merger. The Commission, however, is
concerned with regulatory benchmarks, which allow it to compare companies against one
another.
118 BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 20060-61 % 152.
"19 See Furchtgott/ Whitacre Letter at 2 (cited in note 20) ("[lt is an odd policy position
indeed which holds that an otherwise legitimate merger will be prohibited if it impairs the
government's ability to regulate.").
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In contrast, DOJ follows the antitrust laws, which "act nega-
tively, through a few highly general provisions prohibiting cer-
tain forms of private conduct. The Department generally does not
affirmatively order firms to behave in specified ways; for the most
part, the Department tells private firms what not to do."12 With
the exception of divestiture requirements and the like in consent
decrees,12' DOJ rarely "create[s] the detailed web of affirmative
legal obligations that characterizes classical regulations."'22 By
and large, as Justice Breyer has pointed out, "[tihe antitrust laws
seek to create or maintain the conditions of a competitive mar-
ketplace rather than replicate the results of competition or correct
for the defects of competitive markets." 2' The Department there-
fore sees its role as different from that of the Commission. 124
The Commission has a preference for "competitive processes
and outcomes." 25 And this preference leads it to favor regula-
tion-in which it can control outcomes directly-over market
forces, which may or may not yield the particular result the
Commission prefers. The Commission clings to the belief that it
can promote competition most effectively by actively interfering
with market transactions and conditioning merger approvals to
produce what it believes will be procompetitive results.26 In doing
120 Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform at 157 (cited in note 64).
121 A recent example of aggressive behavior in the divestiture context is DOJ's request
that Microsoft be split into multiple components. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Final Judgment,
United States v Microsoft Corp, Civ Action No 98-1232 (D DC), available online at
<httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4639.htm> (visited May 6, 2000).
122 Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform at 157 (cited in note 64).
123 Id at 156-57.
124 Indeed, a previous antitrust chief expressly warned against an overly regulatory
approach when speaking to FERC about its authority to condition merger approvals and
exercise continued jurisdiction over merged entities under the Federal Power Act:
Although this authority is certainly very useful, I would caution against
allowing it to result in an overly regulatory approach to merger review
during the transition to competition. While I recognize, of course, that
[FERCI is a regulatory agency, and that the electric power industry has
long been highly regulated, restructuring obviously is intended to move
away from that paradigm.
Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 15 (cited in note 14).
125 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc, Transferor, to AT&T Corp, Transferee,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rec 3160, 3169 14 (1999) ("AT&T/TCI").
126 Senator McCain has observed that a majority of the current Commission places "too
little confidence in competition and way too much in regulation." Telecommunications
Reports 27 (May 31, 1,999); see, for example, Kennard Defends FCC on Merger Review at
House Hearing, Communications Daily 1 (Nov 4, 1999) (quoting Chairman Kennard as
stating that his job is to advance competition, a goal he notes is different from that of the
Department).
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so, the Commission makes predictive judgments about the future
and errs on the side of blocking transactions. In addition, the
Commission will consider not just whether the merger will harm
competition, but whether it would "frustrate [its] implementation
and enforcement of the Communications Act and federal commu-
nications policy."'27
In the end, however, the Commission's presumption against
mergers has a negative impact on competition. "The most serious
consequence of an overly broad prohibitory rule is its interference
with mergers that would yield procompetitive or other economic
benefits." 2 ' As Professor Areeda has observed, "many of the ra-
tionales for mergers are fully consistent with the aims of anti-
trust policy and are themselves procompetitive, at least in the
absence of market power." '129 For example, horizontal mergers
"can easily facilitate efficiencies, assign assets to a superior man-
ager, eliminate duplication, or have other effects that benefits the
firms and that antitrust generally regards as beneficial to soci-
ety."3 ° Vertical mergers can drastically reduce transaction costs.
"A merger that improves efficiency enables the merged firm to
compete more effectively and, perhaps, to induce more efficient
performance among its competitors.""1 ' The Commission's over-
broad rule against mergers will inevitably cause many of these
beneficial mergers to collapse and their potential efficiencies to be
lost.
Allowing all but assuredly harmful mergers to materialize
brings another benefit: it maintains a strong market for capital
assets, which in turn "increases the reward of successful entre-
preneurial endeavor."32 That is, the prospect of a lucrative
127 AT&T/TCI, 14 FCC Rec at 3169 14.
128 Areeda and Turner, 4 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application T 905d (cited in note 29).
129 Id at 901a; see also Written Statement by Joel I. Klein before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, Concerning the 1996 Telecommunications Act: An Antitrust Perspective,
1997 WL 14150957 (Sept 17, 1997) ("The Department's basic mandate under the Clayton
Act is to monitor all mergers carefully, ensuring that prospects for competition are not
jeopardized by anticompetitive mergers, while recognizing that in many cases, competition
will be promoted through efficiency-enhancing combinations."); Statement of Joel I. Klein
Before the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate 2 (Feb 26, 1998) ("Klein Feb 26, 1998 Subcommittee
Statement"), <http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/1581.htm> (visited Feb 22, 2000)
("M]ost mergers and other business alliances foster efficiency and thus bring increased
benefits to consumers and businesses.").
130 Areeda and Turner, 4 Antitrust Law at T 901a (cited in note 29).
131 Id.
132 Id at 9 905d.
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merger opportunity in the future entices entrepreneurs initially
to form and expand firms. The Commission's presumption
against mergers deters this behavior.
Ideally, only anticompetitive mergers should be blocked and
all others allowed to proceed. It is impossible, however, to make
perfect judgments in every case: any standard will inevitably be
over- or under-inclusive. The Department proceeds from the
premise that, if one must err, it should be on the side of the free
market, not agency fiat. Free transferability, not regulatory ca-
veat, is more likely to place capital assets "in the hands of those
who will use them to their utmost economic advantage; it thus
tends to maximize society's total output of goods and services." 3'
Moreover, if a telecommunications transaction ultimately proves
to be anticompetitive, action can be taken at that point to remedy
the situation. In contrast, in this dynamic marketplace, there is
nothing that can be done for a merger that has died under the
Commission's presumption against mergers.
This core logic underlies our nation's antitrust laws. Free
market principles prompted Congress to vest authority in gov-
ernment agencies to block mergers under the Clayton Act only
when their effect may be to lessen competition substantially. And,
as a former DOJ antitrust chief has explained, "[a]ntitrust en-
forcement has rightly enjoyed substantial bipartisan support
throughout the years" because "American consumers and busi-
nesses benefit from the kind of free-market economy that anti-
trust enforcement engenders."'34 Indeed, it could be argued that
the same rationale led Congress to pass the 1996 Act, with its
dual and linked goals of promoting competition and reducing
regulation. 5 The Commission's approach to mergers is funda-
mentally at odds with this reasoning, and, accordingly, it threat-
ens to undermine the policies of both Acts. But the Commission is
a prisoner to this approach because of its underlying bias in favor
of broad regulation.
133 Id at I 901a.
134 Klein, Concerning the 1996 Telecommunications Act: An Antitrust Perspective at
*2 (cited in note 129).
135 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, at Preamble,
codified at 47 USC §§ 151 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998). As discussed, Congress did not envi-
sion that the Commission's reign over telecommunications would come to an end. But
Congress indicated clearly that the goal for the Commission is to further competition,
deregulation, and innovation, wherever possible. That is, Congress intended that, wher-
ever possible, the Commission should adopt a hands-off policy.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
III. THE AGENCY MINDSET: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF PROCESS
Thus far, we have focused on how the agencies' respective vi-
sions of government and markets have influenced their substan-
tive merger standards. But that is, at most, only half the story.
Perhaps less obvious, but potentially far more important, is how
the agencies' regulatory (or deregulatory) mindset intersects with
its selection of administrative procedures. In this section, we dis-
cuss the core procedural models and describe the agencies' re-
spective approaches to these paradigms. As we discuss further
below, whether one agrees or disagrees with the Commission's
substantive antitrust approach to mergers, its procedural tactics
in merger reviews raise fundamental questions of administrative
law and policy.
A. The Procedural Paradigms
An agency chooses more than a procedure when it selects a
particular administrative law model;3 ' it also embraces a par-
ticular vision of governance. At its core, governance by adjudica-
tion can be traced to a preference for private action and free mar-
kets over governmental interference. Only when private action
leads to conflict does the adjudicatory process come into play. The
proceeding itself is limited: the focus is on the particular facts
between the parties, and the adjudication is designed simply to
resolve the conflict and to go no further.137 The remedy typically
136 We discuss idealized, Platonic "models" of adjudication and rulemaking, focusing on
their general characteristics and differences. "While the line dividing them may not al-
ways be a bright one, [there is] a recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one
hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases, on the
other." United States v Florida East Coast Railway Co, 410 US 224, 245 (1973). These core
models serve as benchmarks for our discussion of how and why agencies (in particular the
FCC and DOJ) diverge from the ideals and what consequences flow from that departure.
We recognize that, in reality, the line between adjudications and rulemakings is not
nearly so clean. See, for example, NLRB v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 US 759, 770-71 (1969)
(Black concurring) ("The line between [rulemaking and adjudication] is not always a clear
one and in fact the two functions merge at many points."); see also Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev
at 930-32 (cited in note 64) (noting that, in some instances, an adjudication may allow as
much notice and comment as a rulemaking); id at 935-36 (observing that adjudications
can be brought on such a broad scale that the treatment of regnlated individuals can be as
evenhanded as when an agency announces a generally applicable policy in a rulemaking).
In addition, we should note that, for purposes of the APA, there are more intricate proce-
dural differences between the two methods-and between formal and informal proceed-
ings. See APA §§ 5, 7 & 8, codified at 5 USC §§ 554, 556, 557 (1994).
137 See Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L J 571, 587 (1970); see also Colin S. Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv L Rev 393, 403 (1981) (arguing
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focuses "on the removal of irritants than on the attainment of
ideals."13
Because adjudication begins from the reactionary premise
that government should interfere only when particular parties
bring a specific matter before it, it is not a process designed to
obtain the massive amounts of information needed to formulate
general policy that affects large numbers of individuals. Thus, the
general public is not entitled to notice of the action, nor is it given
the right to comment on all the issues raised by the matter."9 In-
stead, the adjudicator relies upon the named parties to provide
the relevant information. In addition, for this essentially com-
mon-law model to work effectively, the adjudicator generally op-
erates under a standard that is broad enough to allow it to decide
the conflict no matter what the circumstances or facts. The adju-
dicator gives content to that standard in the particular case, 4 '
and the adjudication itself then serves as a precedent."4
A rulemaking starts from a fundamentally different premise:
instead of allowing parties to shape the evolution of the law, the
rulemaking model relies upon expert agencies and legislators to
design effective solutions to anticipated problems. Whereas adju-
dication is reactive, rulemaking is proactive. It reaches out to de-
cide potential issues that will affect entire classes of persons and
practices and seeks to shape future behavior by laying out the
ground rules in advance.'42 The rulemaking process, then, is akin
that "adjudication is customarily, if not intrinsically, incremental," that "[t]he partici-
pants' needs circumscribe the decisionmakers' lawmaking role," and that adjudicators
"ordinarily attempt to extend policy no further than needed to dispose of the issues at
hand"). Of course, what is necessary to resolve the conflict is subject to wide interpretation
and depends in large part on one's model of adjudicative justice. See, for example, Jerry L.
Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 Duke L
J 181, 185-90 (describing three models of justice that apply to disability and similar pro-
grams: "bureaucratic rationality," "professional treatment," and "moral judgment").
138 Diver, 95 Harv L Rev at 404 (cited in note 137).
139 Of course, a decision in an adjudication "may have far-reaching significance by
reason of the rule it lays down, and affect many persons besides the particular litigants."
Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 930 (cited in note 64). Indeed, this Article discusses just such a
circumstance. But the procedures attendant to an adjudication reflect the premise that an
adjudication is generally more limited.
140 In so doing, the agency can "evolve detailed and precise rules." Shapiro, 78 Harv L
Rev at 926 (cited in note 64). Or it can offer little guidance as to how particular facts will
be weighed. See Friendly, Federal Administrative Agencies at 97 (cited in note 60).
141 NLRB v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 US at 766.
142 Robert W. Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication," and Exemptions Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U Pa L Rev 621, 630 (1947) ("Rule making is agency
action governing the future conduct either of groups of persons or of a single individual; it
is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future, but also
because it is concerned largely with considerations of policy.").
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to the process of statutory enactment. Although a legislature is
the classic rulemaking body, no one with even a passing famili-
arity of the modern administrative state would deny that agen-
cies provide the bulk of the rules that govern our conduct.
Because rulemakings have such a broad sweep, the agency
rulemaking process varies dramatically from the agency adjudi-
catory process. Because the resulting rule will affect a broad class
of people, an agency provides notice and an opportunity for gen-
eral participation in its deliberative rulemaking process. Mass
participation increases the likelihood that the agency will prom-
ulgate an effective rule because the agency will have relevant in-
formation from a large number and variety of sources.
The model the agency selects.. is not without consequence:
administrative process influences outlooks and outcomes. The
procedural choice frames the perspective of the agency and inter-
ested parties. It determines what information gets considered
and who participates. Indeed, the procedure selected is frequently
tantamount to selecting a particular result.
B. DOJ and FCC Approaches to Adjudication
The Department and the Commission do not merely diverge
as a matter of substantive competition review; they also follow
different procedural models. Although both proceed through ad-
judications, their respective visions of what that entails are
markedly different. That is, just as both agencies give different
content to the "competitive effects" substantive analysis, so too do
the agencies diverge on what it means to conduct an adjudication.
The Department adheres more closely to the traditional model of
an adjudication; the Commission's proceedings resemble rule-
makings as much as adjudications.
We must emphasize, of course, that we are speaking in terms
of generalities. Often, the Commission will approve a license
transfer in a straightforward adjudication. Similarly, we cannot
say that the Department has never taken a proactive regulatory
approach. Some would say Microsoft is such a case. Or, to take an
infamous example from telecommunications, the Department and
Judge Harold Greene collaborated in a twelve-year quasi-
rulemaking after Judge Greene entered the consent decree in
143 "[Tlhe choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency." SEC v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194, 203 (1947).
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1982 ordering AT&T to divest its local operating companies.'"
When the decree was entered, no formal divestiture plan had
been formulated.'45 Judge Greene therefore authorized 110 pri-
vate and public entities to intervene and comment on a proposed
plan.'48 After the Department demanded multiple amendments to
a reorganization plan proposed by AT&T, Judge Greene invited
additional comment on the plan.'47 Some fifty intervenors took
the opportunity to comment, raising hundreds of issues.'48 The
judge then conducted a hearing and entered a 159-page
opinion.' But that was far from the end of the matter. Instead,
what followed was more than a decade of thousands of advisory
letters, briefs, and motions.15 ° The decree had taken on a life of its
own and touched on every aspect of telecommunications. Judge
Greene viewed the decree as "establishing merely a broad outline
of a plan for an extremely complex transaction or series of trans-
actions, with massive implications, leaving many details for sub-
sequent implementation." 5' Indeed, Judge Greene believed "the
decree may be analogized to a piece of legislation"'52 and, accord-
ingly, he (along with input from DOJ) set forth a web of rule-like
mandates that governed such areas as entry into long-distance
markets, entry into wireless long-distance, and entry into infor-
mation services delivery.15 3
Thus, even the Department, which does not administer a set
of substantive policies, has succumbed to the temptation to ex-
pand the scope of an adjudication, and took an active role in the
AT&T divestiture "rulemaking." Nevertheless, this model of gov-
ernment and adjudication is, relatively speaking, rare for DOJ.
The Department generally sees its role as more circumscribed.
The Department does not have a broad public interest mandate
as does the FCC. "Instead, as a law enforcement agency," it has
"the burden of proving that a merger is anticompetitive and ille-
144 Michael K. Kellogg, et al, Federal Telecommunications Law § 4.5 at 216 (Little,
Brown 1st ed 1992).
145 Id
146 I&
147 Id § 4.5 at 219.
148 Kellogg, Federal Telecommunications Law at 219 (cited in note 144).
149 Id.
150 Id § 7.1 at 344-45.
151 United States v Western Electric Co, 578 F Supp 653, 655 n 6 (D DC 1983).
152 United States v Western Electric Co, 592 F Supp 846, 856 n 27 (D DC 1984), appeal
dismissed, 777 F2d 23 (DC Cir 1985).
153 See generally Kellogg, Federal Telecommunications Law §§ 4-7 at 226 (cited in note
144).
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gal." 5' And when the Department reaches such a conclusion, it
looks "for a way to prevent the anticompetitive aspects of that
merger from going forward, while not prohibiting parts of the
deal that do not raise anticompetitive concerns."'55 The Depart-
ment generally focuses on the behavior of the particular parties
before it, and the relief is usually retrospective, not prospective. 5 '
Thus, the Department generally proceeds according to the tradi-
tional common law model and does not seek to impose broader
policies in an adjudication.5 7
The Commission, in contrast, generally takes a much broader
view of an adjudication. As discussed above, the Commission's
main device for expanding the scope of an adjudication is its
power to order merging parties to submit to conditions in order to
obtain license transfer approval. To be sure, some of these condi-
tions are necessary for the parties to comply with existing Com-
mission rules; in those instances, it is hardly an abuse of the
agency's adjudicatory authority to condition a license transfer on
compliance with those rules."5 s Because the license transfer itself
causes the violation, it is perfectly reasonable for the agency to
make complying with the rules a condition of the transfer,
whether or not the condition is directly related to a "competitive
effects" analysis. Indeed, enforcement of existing rules is one of
the core purposes of an adjudication.
154 HR Rep No 105-118 at 9 (statement of Joel Klein) (cited in note 16).
'55 Klein Feb 26, 1998 Subcommittee Statement (cited in note 129).
156 To the extent the Department does issue prospective relief in a consent decree, it is
generally for a finite period. "With regard both to the preparation of proposed draft de-
crees by staff as well as to decree proposals that may be made by defendants, note that the
Division's standard decree language requires that the consent decree expire on the tenth
anniversary of its entry by the court. The staff should not negotiate any decree of less than
10 years' duration, although decrees of longer than 10 years may be appropriate in certain
circumstances." US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Division Manual
Ch IV(E)(2) (3d ed 1998).
17 See Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition at 16 (cited in
note 14) ("[B]ased on centuries of experience, [the Department is now] highly skeptical of
any relief that requires judges or regulators to take on the role of constantly policing the
industry. Relief generally should eliminate the incentive or the opportunity to act anti-
competitively rather than attempt to control conduct directly. [The Department is] institu-
tionally skeptical about code-of-conduct remedies. The costs of enforcement are high and,
in our experience, the regulatory agency often ends up playing catch-up, while the market
forces move forward and the underlying competitive problems escape real detection and
remediation.").
158 See, for example, ATT/TCI, 14 FCC Rec at 3207-08 [ 98-99, 107 (1999) (condi-
tioning approval of license transfer application on AT&T-TCI transferring ownership of
Sprint PCS tracking stock to a trust prior to consummation of the merger in order to bring
the companies in compliance with the Commission's wireless spectrum cap rules).
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Many conditions imposed in license transfer proceedings,
however, do not involve enforcement of existing Commission
rules. Far from it, the conditions themselves are comparable to
new regulations because they impose additional, elaborate, and
intrusive requirements on the merging parties. These conditions,
moreover, rarely reflect the Commission's desire to address a par-
ticular ill effect directly caused by the license transfer before it.
More often, the Commission is concerned with a particular indus-
try practice or trend and sees a license transfer application as its
opportunity to address a general concern, albeit with jurisdiction
over only the parties to the transaction. The Commission realizes
that, because many similarly situated parties will also have
pending license transfer applications, the Commission's policy
can be implemented broadly even if it must do so on a case-by-
case basis.
The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech mergers offer
examples of the Commission camouflaging new general policies in
the context of an adjudication. In approving the Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX merger, the Commission insisted on a laundry list of re-
quirements, including reporting requirements, performance re-
ports, a multitude of tests, and various enforcement mecha-
nisms.159 The Commission even had the parties agree to comply
with requirements that the Eighth Circuit had just struck down,
brazenly asserting that the Commission's defeat in that case re-
sulted in market "uncertainty."6 ° Thus, to get their merger ap-
proved, Bell Atlantic and NYNEX had to give back to the Com-
mission some of what they had won from it in the Eighth Cir-
cuit. 16 1 The merger adjudication gave the Commission a forum it
otherwise lacked to advance its regulatory agenda.
The recent SBC and Ameritech merger provides another il-
lustration of how the Commission effectively imposes new policy
in the context of a specific adjudication. In order to get their
merger approved, SBC and Ameritech agreed to provide ad-
vanced services to customers through a separate affiliate. At the
time the Commission and the merging parties negotiated this
policy, the merits of a separate affiliate policy were being consid-
159 See generally BA/NYNEX, 12 FCC Rec at 20107, Appendix C.
160 See id at 19988 4 ("We must be especially concerned about mergers between in-
cumbent monopoly providers and possible rivals during this initial period of implementa-
tion of the 1996 Act . . . . Key portions of [the Local Competition Orders] recently were
vacated, which created even greater uncertainty as to the pace of development of competi-
tion.").
161 Id at 19993 14, 20070-79 1$ 181-200.
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ered by the Commission in a rulemaking proceeding-which was
to apply to the entire industry."2 The Commission leapfrogged
ahead of that process, however, and effectively made up its mind
in the SBC/Ameritech merger. The Commission noted that
"[e]stablishing an advanced services separate affiliate will pro-
vide a structural mechanism to ensure that competing providers
of advanced services receive effective, nondiscriminatory access to
the facilities and services of the merged firm's" incumbent local
exchange carriers.'63 The Commission believed the condition
would ensure a "level playing field" between the incumbent local
exchange carriers of SBC/Ameritech and its advanced services
competitors, therefore the conditions would "greatly accelerate
competition in the advanced services market."'64 It is difficult to
see how this policy course will not be adopted more broadly based
on the Commission's statements. In fact, the Commission has
followed it since the merger order. Bell Atlantic "voluntarily"
agreed to the same condition in order to obtain approval to pro-
vide long distance.'65 And Bell Atlantic and GTE agreed to a
similar condition to get their merger approved. 166
The Commission is able to impose these requirements in a
merger proceeding because it has the ultimate trump card: its
ability to deny the merger outright. The parties can-and do-
agree to any number of conditions in order to get their mergers ap-
proved. Because a merger is often critical to the competitive sur-
vival of a company, the parties frequently have no other practical
choice. Under these circumstances, it is a bit of a stretch to deem
the conditions "voluntary."167
The SBC/Ameritech merger illustrates the coercive nature of
the dynamic. SBC and Ameritech filed their application for li-
cense transfer approval with the Commission in July of 1998.
Almost a year later, the Commission still had not acted on the
application. The Chairman of the FCC wrote the CEOs of each
company informing them that the Commission's staff had "raised
a number of significant issues with respect to potential public
162 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications. Capa-
bility, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rec
24011, 24051-64 9] 85-117 (1998).
163 SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14859 T 363.
164 I&
165 See Letter from Dee May, Bell Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas at 7 (Dec 16, 1999)
[on file with U Chi Legal F].
166 See BA/GTE, Appendix D (cited in note 108).
167 See, for example, SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14854-55 T 349; BA/NYNEX, 12
FCC Rec at 19992 12, 20069 178.
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interest harms."168 The Chairman told the companies that he had
"serious concerns" about whether the merger satisfied the public
interest standard. He then informed the companies that "[almong
the actions which the Commission could take are to set your ap-
plication for a full hearing or to approve it with conditions."'69 In
effect, the Chairman threatened the parties: craft conditions that
satisfy the staff's concerns or expect a "full hearing" that threat-
ened to drag the merger review process out for several months (if
not years) longer, and that would inevitably yield a denial of the
merger in the absence of conditions because of the "significant"
public interest issues.
Faced with those "options," the Chairman could readily "as-
sume that [SBC and Ameritech] are interested in pursuing dis-
cussions" about conditions. 7 ° As the companies pointed out in
their public interest statement to the Commission, the
SBC/Ameritech merger is part of an overall strategy by the two
companies to enter thirty new markets outside their respective
regions. The merger is critical to their plan, according to the com-
panies, because neither company, on its own, has the resources to
expand to the necessary level.' Thus, as long as the cost of the
conditions extracted by the Commission would be less than the
cost of having the merger denied and thus having their competi-
tive strategy thwarted, the parties would have agreed to the
Commission's terms. The Commission was well aware of this fact
and was bold in its demands. And, as expected, SBC and Ameri-
tech agreed to a multitude of onerous conditions aimed at satis-
fying the Commission's regulatory agenda.'
It is clear, then, that the Commission takes full advantage of
its superior bargaining position in adjudications and extracts
sweeping conditions from the parties by threatening to deny the
merger outright if the parties do not agree to the Commission's
terms. As current Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth has put it,
many of the conditions the Commission extracts even amount to
"social issues [that are] beyond [the FCC's] expertise or author-
ity."'73 Another member of the current Commission, Commis-
168 Kennard Letter at 1 (cited in note 86).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See SBC/Ameritech, Description of the Transaction, Public Interest Showing and
Related Demonstrations, 6-7 (filed with FCC July 24, 1998) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
172 See SBC/Ameritech, Appendix C, 14 FCC Rec at 14964.
173 Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth in
MCIIWorldCom, 13 FCC Rec at 18159. The Commission's condition negotiation process
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sioner Powell, has voiced similar concerns about the Commis-
sion's imposition of conditions that it otherwise could not enact in
a general rulemaking. He has argued "that the Commission's
public interest authority to review transfers of authorizations is
not a license to sweep into the review every possible goal that one
could argue is supported by or consistent with the statute."174 In
particular, he has cautioned that the Commission should not al-
low its "public interest authority to degenerate-in reality or im-
pression-into serving as a "back door" to achieve results the
Commission is unable (or unwilling) to accomplish more directly,
through traditional rulemaking.175 The Commission, in Commis-
sioner Powell's view, should not "impose merger conditions too
easily or make those conditions too excessive," because to do so
"thereby substitute[s] regulators' judgments about how communi-
cations resources should be allocated for the judgment of consum-
ers and competitors in the marketplace."176
It is evident from the FCC's merger orders that the agency as
a whole does not share this view. Instead, the Commission fre-
quently uses its authority over license transfers and certificates
to impose its substantive will on the parties and to require them
to run their business as the Commission sees fit. Thus, the Com-
mission effectuates many of its telecommunications goals piece-
meal through license adjudications instead of through a rule-
making generally applicable to all similarly situated parties.
With virtually every major telecommunications player merging,
the Commission can use its authority to condition mergers as a
back door mechanism to impose its regulatory agenda. The Com-
mission's analysis of competitive effects in license adjudications
inevitably becomes clouded by its desire to get that agenda ad-
vanced. The Commission frequently cannot resist the opportunity
to advance its policy agenda regardless of whether the proceeding
is a rulemaking or an adjudication. As a result, the Department
and the Commission follow drastically divergent procedures even
though they both proceed under an "adjudication" model.
with SBC and Ameritech led Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth to observe once again that
the Commission might not even be able to require some of the conditions it demands "out-
right in a rulemaking." Furchtgott/Whitacre Letter (cited in note 20).
174 Separate Statement of Commissioner Michael K Powell in MCIIWorldCom, 13
FCC Rec at 18166.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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C. Explaining the FCC's Procedural Approach
As we have shown, even in a merger adjudication the Com-
mission proceeds from a decidedly regulatory bias: it seeks to
paint with a broad brush and advance a general policy agenda.
The Commission's license transfer proceedings blend what the
Commission perceives as the advantages of adjudication (flexible
standards, limited judicial review, and marginal notice and com-
ment) with its favorite aspects of rulemaking (governing an entire
industry with broad pronouncements that reach all aspects of
behavior). The Commission frequently extracts onerous condi-
tions from the parties in exchange for merger approval, and those
conditions, in turn, read like additional pages of the Federal
Register, holding the merging parties to new substantive rules
and regulations.
We have already explained why the Commission prefers gen-
erally to pass broad edicts: it is a rulemaking agency at heart,
reliant on the power of regulation over that of the market. This
section explores the specific attractions of furthering broad poli-
cies through adjudications instead of rulemakings and discusses
some unfortunate consequences of this approach.
1. The irresistible advantages of the
adjudication framework.
The Commission's rulemaking approach to license adjudica-
tions can hardly be deemed an accident. The Commission knows
that advancing its regulatory agenda in these proceedings has
enormous advantages over general rulemakings.
a) Freedom to change. Perhaps the greatest attraction to
advancing its substantive policy in an adjudication is the freedom
it gives the Commission. In adjudications, the Commission can
advance its policies in a way that seems entirely fact-specific,
which leaves it room to retain its position in the next case or to
abandon it at will. Judge Friendly observed this phenomenon in
the FCC's treatment of "local interest" as a factor in determining
which carrier gets a broadcast license. He noted that the FCC
had changed its policy, but that the transformation was
slipped into an opinion in such a way that only careful
readers would even know what had happened, without ar-
ticulation of reasons, and with the prior authorities not
overruled, so that the opinion writers remain free to pull
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them out of the drawer whenever the agency wishes to
reach a result supported by the old rule but not the new.'77
In effect, the agency "disguis[es] its policymaking as factfind-
ing" allowing it to change policies as easily as the facts before it
change. 7 ' Or, as Chief Justice Hughes described "the unscrupu-
lous administrator's prayer: 'let me find the facts for the people of
my country, and I care little who lays down the general princi-
ples.' 179
This freedom can be especially important as an agency ad-
justs to a changing regulatory landscape. For example, the 1996
Act fundamentally alters the view of telecommunications. Con-
gress no longer sanctions the view that local markets are natural
monopolies; the Act seeks to replace regulation with competition
and market forces. In the meantime, the Commission is left to
police the transition. In these circumstances, the Commission
must appreciate the opportunity to use its merger adjudications
as laboratories to test new policies before implementing them on
a wider scale. If the conditions it adopts do not yield the expected
results, the Commission can abandon them in the next case by
relying on the fact that different merging parties are before it. If
the conditions succeed, the Commission can continue to require
them in future proceedings or even in a broader regulation. If the
Commission initially announced its policy through regulations
instead of conditions, its power to advance its own agenda would
177 Friendly, Federal Administrative Agencies at 63 (cited in note 60). See also Diver,
95 Harv L Rev at 408-09 (cited in note 137) (summarizing critics of agencies that adopt
"incremental" policies resulting in "a paper veneer behind which rank favoritism or obse-
quiousness could flourish").
178 See Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc v NLRB, 522 US 359, 376 (1998); see also
Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of 'Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the
Failure of Judicial Review, 75 BU L Rev 387, 405 (1995) ("On occasion, the Board ma-
nipulates its findings regarding industrial reality in order to mask an out-and-out policy
judgment as the mere product of impartial legislative factfinding. That is, rather than
acknowledging that a policy is based purely on its judgment as to what constitutes the
most desirable industrial course, the Board will instead assert that the policy necessarily
follows from its findings of legislative fact."). As Professor Shapiro has observed, "[there
are clear indications that when an administrative rule, either substantive or procedural, is
embodied in a regulation, a court will be much less willing to sustain an agency's disre-
gard of that rule, at least in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of why the regula-
tion is not controlling." Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 951 (cited in note 64).
179 NLRB v Curtin Matheson, 494 US 775, 819 (1990) (Scalia dissenting) (citation and
quotation omitted). See also Seidenfeld, 51 Admin L Rev at 467 (cited in note 50) (noting
that the APA allows agency heads to reverse the facts found as well as the ultimate deci-
sion of an ALJ precisely because "much policy is set via adjudicatory decisions and ...
fact-finding can affect the implementation of policy"); id at 468 ("[Ain agency may couch a
change of policy as a modification of factual presumptions or burdens of proof to alter
outcomes.").
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be far more limited. The Commission would formally have to
abandon its prior rule with sound reasoning, instead of trying to
distinguish its way around a prior case.
b) Freedom from interference. Second, and relatedly, im-
posing its will through conditions in an adjudication effectively
shields the Commission's new rules from judicial review and con-
gressional oversight. By keeping its policies grounded in what
appear to be the facts of a particular merger, the Commission is
able to implement policies with far less oversight.
The option of "voluntary conditions" is especially likely to
shield the agencies policies from judicial review. That is, the im-
position of policies via conditions on a particular merger is un-
likely to get to the judicial review stage because the parties
themselves are frequently in no position to challenge the Com-
mission's order. The parties, at least on the surface, "voluntarily"
agree to proposed conditions in order to obtain rapid approval of
their merger. In today's competitive environment, the ability to
merge quickly is often tantamount to the ability to compete.
Rather than face an outright denial of their application from the
Commission and a lengthy judicial review process,18 ° merging
parties will accede to the Commission's conditions by "proposing"
the conditions themselves, even if the parties believe them to be
unlawful.181
The main reason the parties agree to the Commission's terms
is to close their deal quickly. As the D.C. Circuit has observed,
"[in this dynamic and technologically innovative industry, a pro-
posed venture may become obsolete in just a few years."182 Thus,
"[t]o delay a project six months will increase capital cost and di-
minish technological advantage; to delay it a year or more may
destroy its attractiveness as an investment."183 Similarly, once the
180 See United States v FCC, 652 F2d 72, 91 (DC Cir 1980) ("The sad truth about
agency decisionmaking and evidentiary inquiries is that they take time; and time often
works to the advantage of one party over another.").
181 See Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, Wall St J at A18 (cited in note 113) (Merging
parties "do not publicly complain too much because that would annoy the FCC, which has
ultimate regulatory control over their business, both today and tomorrow. They do not go
to court, out of fear that the corresponding delay will sink this and future deals. They
cannot allow anything-no matter how arbitrary and demanding-to threaten their merg-
ers."); see also Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell, Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part) SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 15198 ("[Tlhe coercive effect of having
the applicants over a barrel hoping to gain merger approval dramatically improves the
chances that the companies will 'agree' to abide by the conditions.").
182 United States v FCC, 652 F2d at 95.
183 Id.
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party receives the license or certificate, it generally has no inter-
est in obtaining judicial review of the voluntary nature of the
bargain struck with the agency because it is not worth the uncer-
tainty and delay-and the Commission may then deny the appli-
cation if the conditions no longer hold.
Thus, the temptation to extract conditions that effectuate the
agency's policy is overwhelming: parties will agree to a variety of
onerous conditions to get a merger approved, and those "volun-
tary" commitments are unlikely to be reviewed by a court. As Pro-
fessor Shapiro puts it, "the 'lifted eyebrow,' backed by a veiled or
express threat" that the merger will be denied "can be an effec-
tive means of declaring and applying a given policy free from the
restraints of judicial review."184 The Commission recognizes the
vulnerability of the merging parties and seizes upon its superior
bargaining position as an opportunity to further its substantive
goals.
Moreover, even if a court reviews the agency's imposition of
conditions or policies, the agency is more likely to survive a judi-
cial challenge than if it implemented those policies broadly in a
rulemaking.'85 "An agency that declares and applies a rule in the
course of an adjudication often has two strings to its bow on judi-
cial review."'86 That is, a reviewing court could affirm the policy
outright or it could doubt the legality of the policy as a general
matter but affirm the result in the particular case on the ground
that the result in that case was proper. 87
Furthermore, if an agency's policy "is not the one set forth in
its opinion but rather amounts to the sum of that policy's applica-
tion in innumerable cases"-which is true of the Commission's
application of the "public interest" test in its merger orders-"the
court will not only be precluded from passing on the validity of
the policy, but will most likely dispose of the appeal without ever
knowing the substance of the actual policy."'88 The parties, if they
challenge the conditions at all, are likely to challenge only the
application of the public interest test to their particular case and
184 Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 923 (cited in note 64).
185 See, for example, Flynn, 75 BU L Rev at 422 (cited in note 178) (noting that the
NLRB's "hide-the-ball methodology has been a success in maximizing the agency's policy-
making autonomy").
186 Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 944 (cited in note 64).
187 Id at 944-45; see also Flynn, 75 BU L Rev at 413 (cited in note 178) (noting that,
when an agency hides its policies in factual findings instead of a stated standard, a court
is "focused at all times on the policy's application to a particular set of facts rather than on
the substance of the policy itself").
188 Flynn, 75 BU L Rev at 414 (cited in note 178).
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not raise a broader indictment against the Commission. And
Congress is similarly hindered in trying to evaluate the agency's
policy when it is implemented in this fashion; thus Congress can-
not exercise effective oversight.189
Agencies are well aware that they face far less scrutiny when
they proceed with a policy through case-by-case adjudication than
when they proceed through rulemaking. The National Labor Re-
lations Board, for instance, proceeds almost exclusively by adju-
dication to avoid trapping itself behind the bright lines of a
rule. 90 Of course, as the Supreme Court recently observed, "a[n]
agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed
even political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as fact-
finding."19' But it is easier to state the principle than to police it.
Indeed, in the very case in which the Court announced this prin-
ciple, four Justices disagreed that the agency engaged in the sort
of policy determination of which it was accused.'92
The Commission's behavior, then, is not an example of a dia-
bolical agency run amok. Rather, it is the logical outgrowth of an
agency seeking to expand its regulatory agenda, presumably with
the benign motive of advancing what it perceives as positive so-
cial policies.'93 An adjudication offers a forum in which the Com-
mission can insulate those policies from review and preserve its
own power.
189 Friendly, Federal Administrative Agencies at 6 (cited in note 60) ("[Flailure by the
agency to make clear what it is doing impedes both executive challenge and legislative
response.").
190 See Allentown Mack, 522 US at 374 ("The National Labor Relations Board,
uniquely among major federal administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually
all the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than rulemaking."); Flynn, 75
BU L Rev at 399 (cited in note 178) (arguing that the NLRB engages in policymaking
through adjudication as "a means of furthering particular policy goals without attracting
unwanted attention from the other branches of government").
191 Allentown Mack, 522 US at 376.
192 Id at 379-87 (Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, in NLRB
v Curtin Matheson, although a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the Board
could refuse to adopt a "presumption that striker replacements oppose a union," three
dissenters argued that the Commission was disguising its policymaking as factfinding.
494 US at 819 (Scalia dissenting).
193 See Flynn, 75 BU L Rev at 445 (cited in note 178) (arguing that the NLRB's "use of
veiled policymaking ... appears in many instances to be directed not simply toward pro-
tecting the Board's turf and maximizing the agency's power at the expense of the courts,
but also toward protecting important statutory goals from the substantial possibility of
judicial obstruction").
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2. The inevitable and unfortunate consequences.
Although the agency apparently believes it advances the so-
cial good by doing so, it sacrifices the democratic values of our
system of government when it mixes and matches aspects of the
procedural models at will and seeks to evade review. With no ju-
dicial review or congressional oversight, an unaccountable agency
can advance policies that may be completely at odds with the
legislation under which it acts.'94 Limiting notice and comment,
moreover, essentially cuts off the dialogue with regulated and
interested parties, leaving the agency to shape policy in a vac-
uum.195 This approach results in the worst of all possible worlds
from a rule-of-law perspective:19 an agency with the power to
imbed common law norms as binding rules, with virtually no
oversight by interested parties or reviewing bodies. In this sec-
tion, we explore in greater detail the dangers of a hybrid ap-
proach that seeks to advance a broad policy agenda in an adjudi-
cation in which the public is not allowed to participate effectively.
First, the hybrid approach is less likely than a rulemaking to
produce a substantively sound policy. To be sure, "[a]djudicated
cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the formulation
of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein."
197
But the procedural framework of an adjudication is ill-suited for
this role. An adjudication generally involves input from only the
parties to the particular conflict; these parties offer a limited per-
spective on an issue and can supply a relatively modest amount
of data to inform the inquiry. For example, only the merging par-
ties have notice of all the issues of concern to the Commission-
and only they can comment when it matters most.198 The condi-
194 An evaluation of the substantive merit of the conditions the Commission has ex-
tracted in merger proceedings is beyond the scope of this Article. But it does appear that
the volume and scope of conditions is at least in tension with the 1996 Act's deregulatory,
market-based goals.
195 This compromises civic republican values. "Representatives of all interests poten-
tially affected by a government action must have meaningful opportunities to engage in
discussion about the action." Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv L Rev 1511, 1530 (1992). For a general discussion, see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539 (1988).
196 "Rule of law" can mean many things, of course. For a general discussion, see Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum L
Rev 1 (1997). Here, we refer to its core purposes of allowing parties "to plan their affairs
with reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal consequences of vari-
ous actions" and its "guarantee against some types of official arbitrariness." Id at 7-8.
197 NLRB v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 US 759, 765 (1969).
198 See, for example, Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell, Concurring in
Part and Dissenting in Part, SBC/Ameritech, 14 FCC Rec at 15200 ("I am of the view that
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tions imposed on a license transfer application-in contrast to
regulations announced in a rulemaking--do not permit interested
parties sufficient opportunity for notice and comment. Some con-
ditions are implemented without any notice and comment-they
are the result of private negotiations between the Commission
and the merging parties.'99
Even if the Commission allows for notice and comment on
proposed conditions,"' the reality of the Commission's merger
review process makes this notice and comment less effective than
it is in the context of a rulemaking. That is so primarily because
the conditions are only released to the general public after the
Commission staff and the merging parties hammer out all the
details in lengthy, private negotiating sessions.0 1 For example,
the SBC and Ameritech merger conditions proposed for comment
were the result of months of bargaining between the merging
parties and the Commission staff20 2 in meetings that were not
open to the public.20' Because the Commission staff had already
invested a great deal of time and effort in the conditions put forth
and because the final package represented an interrelated series
this inherently bilateral [merger review] process does not and cannot take sufficient ac-
count of the issues that might be raised by third parties.").
199 See Hetke/Mancini Letter at 1 (cited in note 93).
200 The Commission adopted this approach in the SBC and Ameritech merger. See
SBClAmeritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14855 351.
201 Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth has objected to the manner by which the parties
and the Commission staff craft conditions:
It is unclear to me why certain parties should be permitted to create an
additional, private record before the Commission . . . . We should either
reopen the comment period, or close the record and proceed to a final de-
cision by Commission vote and order. Assuming that the imposition of
conditions is permissible . . . I fail to see why the Commission would need
to consult the parties to determine whether it "would be possible to craft
conditions" that would allay any public interest concerns we might have.
Surely the Commission knows how to do so on its own.
FurchtgottWhitacre Letter at 3 (cited in note 20), quoting Kennard Letter (cited in note
86).
202 See SBClAmeritech, 14 FCC Rec at 14855 T 351.
203 See Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, Wall St J A18 (cited in note 113). Commis-
sioner Furchtgott-Roth has described the process thus:
Commission staffers engage in months of secret negotiations without a
clear written record of what is being negotiated or why. The FCC issues
public pronouncements about open processes, and yet denies anyone from
the public access to, or minutes from, the secret meetings. Then, re-
markably, a complex and detailed set of 'voluntary' promises are submit-
ted to the FCC for approval. Like puffs of smoke from the Vatican, it is a
sign: The deed is done."
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of compromises, one can assume that commenting parties oper-
ated at a disadvantage when they argued against a particular
condition or when they sought additional concessions. And, in
fact, according to Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth, "not a single
substantive change to the [SBC/Ameritech] conditions was made
after public comment. 2 °4 The Commission is far more likely to be
flexible and open-minded when it publishes a notice of proposed
rulemaking and has less invested.0 5
Inevitably, the Commission's substantive policies suffer when
different voices and views are stifled or unnoticed." 6 In contrast,
a rulemaking allows all interested parties to comment, which is
likely to yield a broader range of perspectives and a greater sup-
ply of information. 28 Thus, the agency is far better informed to
make a general pronouncement in the latter situation than in the
former.0 9
In addition, as with all adjudications, commenting parties in
an FCC merger proceeding are necessarily limited by the facts of
the particular license transfer application and may not see the
larger ramifications when the Commission's policies are pre-
sented in this format.2 10 Indeed, some parties affected by the
Commission's new policy might not even realize that the Com-
204 Id.
205 To be sure, an agency's proposal in a rulemaking shares some of these same charac-
teristics. The staff reaches a proposed solution and is certainly inclined to adopt it even
before the public submits its comments. But the dynamic is far different when the agency
reaches its proposed solution after long and detailed negotiations-and when a deal with
the merging parties rests on adoption of those conditions. The agency has more invested in
the latter circumstance, and commenters therefore face a much higher hurdle when trying
to get the agency to change its mind.
206 See Wyman-Gordon, 394 US at 777-78 (Douglas dissenting) (noting that the notice
and comment process in a rulemaking helps the agency to "learn from the suggestions of
outsiders and often benefit from that advice").
207 Ginnane, 95 U Pa L Rev at 628 (cited in note 142) ("The rule making provisions of
[the APA] are designed to provide for public participation in the making of substantive
rules by federal agencies.").
208 See Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 591 (cited in note 137) ('[N]otice, carried by special-
ized publications to those who are potentially affected, sets in motion the processes of
private groups who will seek to advance their own policy by mobilizing their sources of
information and experience and making them available to the agency."); id at 596 (noting
that "[any limitation upon participation excludes potentially relevant experience, which
in an economy as vast, complex, and varied as ours, should be known as completely as
possible before an agency promulgates a policy" and observing that "a rule making re-
quirement assumes that litigants in individual cases do not represent the full range of
possible fact situations and arguments potentially involved in a prospective rule").
209 See id at 588.
210 Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 938-40 (cited in note 64).
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mission is establishing a benchmark or changing course in a
manner that will affect them later.211
There is, moreover, the danger that dominant factors in par-
ticular cases will skew an agency's policy in an unintended man-
ner.212 It is possible that the facts of a particular case will mask a
broader question that goes to the true heart of a policy matter.21
In addition, when an agency makes policies in adjudications, its
determinations may not follow a coherent order; when an issue
arises depends entirely on when parties come to the agency.
Thus, the agency may find itself reviewing a series of interrelated
issues in piecemeal fashion, and the substantive results may be
at odds with one another. In a rulemaking, the agency can de-
termine what issues to consider and when, so it can evaluate all
interrelated questions in one action and decide them in concert.2 14
The agency can also calibrate which aspects of an issue are more
important if tradeoffs are necessary.
Second, a rulemaking is more likely than a hybrid adjudica-
tion to produce a clear statement of policy. It is difficult to deter-
mine the precise policy of an agency when it is buried in an adju-
dication involving singular facts and circumstances. In contrast, a
rule promulgated in a rulemaking will generally be published in
the Federal Register and, necessarily be written in a manner that
is divorced from individualized facts.215 This clarity generally
makes the rule more effective. Individuals will know the content
of the rule and can adjust their behavior accordingly, as opposed
to testing the bounds of a seemingly fact-specific determination
contained in an adjudication.216 The greater certainty also allows
regulated individuals and entities to invest in productive enter-
prises without fear that the conduct will violate a vague pro-
211 Id at 940 ("[T]he enunciation of rules in adjudicatory proceedings frequently has
the effect of 'hiding the ball' from those who are not initiated into the mysteries of a par-
ticular agency and its works.").
212 I&
213 See Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 937-40 (cited in note 64) (discussing an example
from the FTC and concluding that "[i]f an important or novel question is suggested by an
adjudication, especially one not necessary to a decision, an effort to resolve it may end by
submerging the actual controversy and delaying its conclusion unduly, while at the same
time improperly coloring the larger issue and thwarting fully informed and objective con-
sideration").
214 Id; see also Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 590-91 (cited in note 137).
215 See Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 941 (cited in note 64) (observing that promulgated
regulations "can serve the function of readily accessible codification").
216 See Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 590 (cited in note 137) ("Clearly enunciated and prop-
erly drawn rules should reduce litigation by authoritatively advising the regulated what
may, must, or must not be done.").
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nouncement in an adjudication. This clarity also facilitates en-
forcement.
An adjudication or hybrid proceeding lends itself to greater
uncertainty because the agency is not forced to enunciate a prin-
ciple of governance; instead, the agency can take an incremental
approach and leave itself room to alter its policy. 217 For example,
the Commission's erratic application of the "public interest" test
makes it virtually impossible for even the merging parties to
know ex ante which aspects of the transaction will concern the
Commission. Although the Commission focuses on competitive
effects, its analysis of competitive effects includes virtually any-
thing of concern to the Commission, from regulatory benchmarks
to universal service. "The effect of many standards, however, is
virtually the same as having none at all. There is no clear indica-
tion of which standards are more important, how they are to be
individually applied, or how varying degrees of conformity are to
be balanced."218
In addition, the Commission's analysis of potential competi-
tion is wholly speculative-no one can know what the future
holds, so it is impossible to determine what the Commission will
predict. This uncertainty helps account for the fact that some
mergers are subjected to long delays, while others have been
rapidly reviewed and approved by the Commission.219 Unfortu-
nately, it is entirely unclear ex ante which transactions will get
this favorable treatment.2 For parties planning complicated
217 See Diver, 95 Harv L Rev at 403 (cited in note 137). Judge Friendly has described
several instances where an agency's failure to take steps to define and clarify a broad
statutory standard in an adjudication has led to unpredictability and incomprehensibility.
For a general discussion, see Friendly, Federal Administrative Agencies (cited in note 60).
Judge Friendly notes that an agency could remedy this lack of coherence by various meth-
ods, including rulemakings. See id at 142-46.
218 Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform at 79 (cited in note 64). We frequently use the
term "rules" throughout this Article, but our analysis could apply to "standards" as well.
That is, whether an agency adopts a bright-line rule or a flexible standard, its policy de-
termination is likely to be more comprehensible in a rulemaking than an adjudication (or
hybrid proceeding). There is, of course, a heated debate among scholars about the merits
of rules versus standards. See, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Ilarv L Rev 22 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685
(1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989).
That debate, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
219 See, for example, Applications of Bourbeuse Telephone Company and Fidelity Tele-
phone Company for Consent to Assignment of Authority Under Section 214 of the Commu-
nications Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Dkt 98-210 (Dec 21, 1998).
220 See, for example, Press Statement of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth Regarding
Proposed SBC/Ameritech Conditions, available online at <http-//www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
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transactions, the uncertainty is frequently as troublesome as de-
lay. If the Commission followed a rulemaking apprbach, instead
of relying on fact-intensive adjudications to further its policies, it
is more likely that the Commission would announce clearer rules
and standards, which would, in turn, help parties adjust their
behavior and make sound business plans.
Third, a rulemaking generally subjects agency policy to
greater political and judicial accountability. As to political ac-
countability, rulemakings require notice of the proposed action,
giving citizens and government officials advance warning of a
proposed course. This enables politically accountable executive
and congressional officials to exert influence over the agency.221 If
an agency makes a policy determination in an adjudication, there
might not be such advance warning, and it may be difficult or
impossible for political officials to weigh in.
As to judicial accountability, a rule announced in a rulemak-
ing is far more likely to be susceptible to judicial review. As
noted, a policy announced in a rulemaking is more likely to lead
to a clearer articulation of the agency's position than a policy an-
nounced in an adjudication; it is often quite difficult to discern
agency policy when announced in an adjudication because it in-
termingles with facts, and it is frequently difficult to determine
how those facts and circumstances were weighed by the agency. 22
Thus, the easiest way for an agency to avoid the fallout from an
unpopular decision or to further its regulatory agenda even when
it conflicts with congressional intent or its enabling statute is to
FurchtgottRoth/Statements/sthfr926.html> (visited Jan 22, 2000) ("The Commission
routinely grants tens of thousands of license transfers annually, holds some up for a low
degree of scrutiny, and holds a few up for close scrutiny, all without clear and written
rules about which transfers fall in which category"); see also Separate Statement of Com-
missioner Furchtgott-Roth in AT&TITCI, 14 FCC Rec at 3240 ("[M]erging parties have no
clear notice as to the threshold showing for determining the scale of FCC license transfer
review when mergers are involved. Apparently, only the Commission knows a facially
clear case for review when it sees one, and it is unwilling to say what such a case looks
like.").
221 See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L Econ & Org 243 (1987); see also
Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 598 (cited in note 137).
222 See Flynn, 75 BU L Rev at 404 (1995) (cited in note 178) (noting that the NLRB's
practice of making policy in the course of adjudications and its "practice of hiding behind
multifactored tests instead of acknowledging well-defined rules of decision makes judicial
review of its policymaking much more difficult"); Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 590 (cited in
note 137) (asserting that agency policy announced in adjudicatory decisions can yield a
"diffuse, overly subtle mosaic of [agency] doctrine"); Friendly, Federal Administrative
Agencies at 103-04 (cited in note 60) (describing the Civil Aeronautics Board's refusal to
discuss how it weighed various facts and pointing out that "such an undifferentiated list of
criteria leaves the agency free to decide any case any way it wishes").
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bury that policy in individual cases. The Commission's approach
to merger reviews is Exhibit A of this phenomenon. Its merger
conditions seem fact-specific, but they are actually much broader
statements of agency policy that evade judicial review.
Fourth, rulemaking is generally a more efficient method of
policymaking. It is far more cumbersome to extract and present
legislative facts in an adjudication via witnesses and in compli-
ance with various other evidentiary rules; in a rulemaking, the
information may be presented in its most direct form.223 Moreo-
ver, an agency's articulation of a rule in a rulemaking is binding
on a broad class of individuals, thereby eliminating the need to
relitigate the same issues.224 This saves time and limited agency
resources. Indeed, it allows agency personnel to concentrate their
efforts on major policy determinations without getting bogged
down in the factual peculiarities of individual cases.225
The Commission's merger review process shows how long and
cumbersome it can be for an agency to use an adjudication as a
forum for making larger policies. And even though the Commis-
sion often pursues the same agenda, it must renegotiate the con-
ditions each time. For example, the conditions in SBC/Ameritech
and Bell Atlantic/GTE overlap in many respects, but both pro-
ceedings involved lengthy negotiations because Bell Atlantic and
GTE were not, strictly speaking, bound by the Commission's prior
order conditionally approving the SBC/Ameritech merger.
Fifth, a hybrid approach risks the inequitable treatment of
regulated parties-and therefore raises fundamental questions of
fairness and administrative due process. An agency pronounce-
ment in an adjudication governs the parties to that proceeding
immediately, but it is unclear when and whether the agency's
policy will be applied to others. A rulemaking, in contrast, applies
to a broad class of individuals simultaneously.226
The Commission's merger review proceedings illustrate this
dynamic. Not all similarly situated companies merge at the same
time. Thus, inevitably, some companies will operate without the
burden of a condition even though the rationale for imposing the
223 But see Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 Tex L Rev 525, 528, 532-36 (1997) (arguing that the
rulemaking process has ossified and noting further that "[tihe rulemaking exercise is often
considerably complicated by the absence of information on relevant questions and the
corresponding need to draw inferences from existing data").
224 See William F. West, Administrative Rulemaking: Politics and Process 50
(Greenwood 1985).
225 See Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 591-92 (cited in note 137).
226 Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 935 (cited in note 64).
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condition applies to them as well. For example, although other
incumbents were in the same position as Bell Atlantic/NYNEX,
the Commission did not seek to enact the merger conditions as
part of a general rulemaking applicable to all similarly situated
incumbents. Similarly, SBC and Ameritech adhered to require-
ments that, for a time, others did not face.227 Enacting a rule to
address concerns that apply to all incumbent local carriers would
treat similarly situated competitors evenhandedly; in contrast,
"an order directed to only one permits his competitors to gain an
unfair advantage,"22 at least until the competitors themselves
face the Commission's merger review process.
Finally, a hybrid approach to rulemaking sacrifices demo-
cratic participation and the integrity of the agency process.
Rulemaking allows broad public participation in shaping the final
rule.229 Democracy suffers when true notice and comment is sti-
fled: "[p]ublic airing of problems through rule making makes the
bureaucracy more responsive to public needs and is an important
brake on the growth of absolutism."23  As Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth observes, the back door "quid pro quo" nature of
the Commission's merger process-if "you do X, which I may not
be able to require outright in a rulemaking, I will grant your li-
cense transfer-is damaging to the integrity of this institution."231
All this is not to say that agencies should use adjudications
only to apply and implement existing policies. As the Supreme
Court recognized in SEC v Chenery Corp,232 adjudication has a
broad role in the administrative decisional arsenal:
"[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency couid not reasonably foresee, problems which must
be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule.
227 See Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, Wall St J A18 (cited at note 115) ("For three
years, SBC/Ameritech will be a regulatory Frankenstein, different from every other regu-
lated entity in America."). The Commission eventually imposed similar conditions on the
merger of Bell Atlantic and GTE.
228 Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 935 (cited in note 64).
229 Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 266
(Little, Brown 3d ed 1994).
230 Wyman-Gordon, 394 US at 778 (Douglas dissenting); but see Davis and Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise at 424 (cited in note 229) (pointing out that, although
"[plublic participation can ... promote rationality by enlarging the policymaker's field of
vision, his burden of investigation, and disciplining his substantive biases," it also 'can
just as easily subordinate to the tyranny of selective self-interest any dispassionate search
for utopian solutions").
231 Furchtgott/Whitacre Letter at 2 (cited in note 20).
232 SEC v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194, 203 (1947).
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Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with
a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative
judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be
so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible to
capture within the boundaries of a general rule."233
Moreover, because policies produced in a rulemaking will govern
a broad class of behavior and individuals as opposed to an indi-
vidual set of circumstances, they are necessarily over- and under-
inclusive.3 4 In the instances outlined by the Court in Chenery,
rules announced in rulemakings are especially susceptible to
sweeping too broadly or narrowly.25 Adjudications, in contrast,
allow for fine-tuning at the margins and can give content to an
uncertain landscape until broader, more concrete policies can be
formulated.236
The Commission's hybrid approach, however, does not seem
necessitated in all, or even most, cases by any uncertain or rap-
idly changing regulatory policy.237 On the contrary, the Commis-
sion often seems quite sure of its policies but prefers to imple-
ment them without the impediments associated with rulemak-
ings. Under these circumstances, there is little justification for
233 Id at 202; see also Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 927-29 (cited in note 64).
234 "Rules, by their nature, generalize, and most generalizations are less than wholly
accurate." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implement-
ing the Constitution, 111 Harv L Rev 54, 118 (1997). A rulemaking is more likely to pro-
duce a more generalized standard than an adjudication, which is anchored by specific
facts. Moreover, a rulemaking is also more susceptible to producing a result closer to the
"rule" end of the rule/standard continuum than an adjudication. See Seidenfeld, 51 Admin
L Rev at 436 (cited in note 50) ('Rules ... are by their nature over and under inclusive:
They prohibit some conduct that their promulgator would condone and allow other con-
duct that their promulgator would condemn.").
235 332 US at 203.
236 See Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 927 (cited in note 64) (noting that, in some in-
stances, "it may never be feasible, even after the accumulation of considerable experience,
to do more than announce the criteria and give some indication of their relative weight"
and further observing that, in still other circumstances, "the accumulation of experience in
individual cases is a necessary prelude to any effort to elaborate statutory standards in a
manner that deals realistically with actual problems rather than with hypothetical cases
that may never arise").
237 Compare with Diver, 95 Harv L Rev at 431 (cited in note 137). Diver discusses two
different models of agency policymaking-the incrementalism model (which loosely par-
allels the adjudication model we have discussed) and the comprehensive rationalist model
(which, to an extent, mirrors our rulemaking paradigm). See id. He notes that the com-
prehensive rationalist model "should be the preferred way to make policy in relative stable
environments," "when small errors in policy can cause irreversible or catastrophic harm,"
and "in those policy regimes involving egregious-and irremediable-misallocations of
political power among persons most intimately affected." Id. In contrast, incrementalism
is a "sensible response to technical uncertainty and political ferment." Id.
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the Commission's end-run around the rulemaking safeguards." 8
Instead, as the Supreme Court has observed, "rulemaking is gen-
erally a 'better, fairer, and more effective' method of implement-
ing a new industry-wide policy than is the uneven application of
conditions in isolated license renewal proceedings."239
CONCLUSION
The Commission's regulatory mindset drives it to a funda-
mentally different approach to mergers than that of the Depart-
ment. The Commission presumes that a merger should be blocked
unless the parties prove it will promote competition. The Com-
mission will also impose conditions on the transaction that it be-
lieves will advance its regulatory policy goals. The Department
takes a decidedly more laissez-faire approach. As we have also
shown, the differences between the two agencies go beyond the
substantive standards. The Commission frequently uses merger
adjudications to advance various social policies that it would like
to impose broadly on an industry. It generally achieves this end
by leveraging its power to deny a merger to extract conditions
from merging parties-which, in today's consolidation frenzy, es-
sentially includes most regulated telecommunications players.
In this Article, our goal was not only to describe how an
agency's ultimate view of governance influences its substantive
choices, but also to demonstrate the power of this view on the
agency's procedural choices. The Commission's approach to tele-
communications mergers shows the powerful effect a regulatory
bias can have on both substance and process-and how the two
interact to achieve the agency's goals.
We have also offered a criticism of the Commission's ap-
proach. But while we believe the Commission's view of "competi-
tive effects" is difficult to square with market dynamics, we do
238 See Bernstein, 79 Yale L J at 617 (cited in note 137) ("An underlying premise of the
APA is that an agency should consult those whom it regulates, since the latter often pos-
sess information, experience and expertise pertinent to wisely constructed rules"); Wy-
man-Gordon, 394 US at 764 ("The rule-making provisions of [the APA] ... were designed
to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application.") (citing H Rep
No 1980, 79th Cong, 2d Sess, 21-26 (1946); S Rep No 752, 79th Cong, 1st Sess, 13-16
(1945)); Wyman-Gordon, 394 US at 771 (Black concurring) ("It was evidently contemplated
[by Congress] that administrative agencies like the Labor Board would follow [the APA's
rulemaking procedures] when setting to announce a new rule of law to govern parties in
the future."). See also Friendly, Federal Administrative Agencies at 146-47 (cited in note
60); Davis and Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise at § 6.7 265-66 (cited in note 229);
Shapiro, 78 Harv L Rev at 942 (cited in note 64); Ginnane, 95 U Pa L Rev at 623 (cited in
note 142).
239 Community Television of Southern California v Gottfried, 459 US 498, 511 (1983).
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not mean to suggest that the policies it ultimately advances un-
der that heading are otherwise improper. That is, while we ob-
serve that the Commission has forced a variety of unrelated poli-
cies into a "competition" box to allow it to extract conditions in
merger proceedings, we do not mean to express an opinion on the
underlying merit of the various policies it has sought to imple-
ment in these proceedings. What we do argue, however, is that, to
the extent the Commission wants to improve the available op-
tions for consumers in underserved areas, further the deployment
of advanced services, or advance any other policy agenda, it
should do so openly and directly, in general rulemaking proceed-
ings. As we have attempted to show, the Commission's use of
merger proceedings to achieve the same ends distorts the "compe-
tition" analysis and tends to short-circuit fundamental processes
that ensure proper participation by interested parties and that
allow the judiciary and Congress to exercise proper oversight.
While we understand the agency's impulses to take this ap-
proach, at bottom, there is no need for the Commission to further
its regulatory agenda through license adjudications. The Com-
mission already has the authority to regulate the merging parties
directly. There is no reason to doubt that the Commission could
require the merged entity to comply with all of its legally valid
substantive rules just as effectively as it could require the single
companies that make up the merged entity to comply with the
merger conditions. Of course, if the merger itself would result in a
violation of the Commission's rules-for example, if the merger
would bring the combined entity over subscriber limits or would
result in unlawful wireless overlaps-the Commission could ref-
use to grant the necessary license or certificate until the merged
company is in compliance. The Commission could also condition
the license or certificate on compliance with its rules. But the
Commission need not go beyond the particular license transfer
before it.24°
240 As discussed in note 20, there is a substantial difference between reviewing a par-
ticular license transfer and reviewing an entire merger "writ large." See Separate State-
ment of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, AT&T/TCI, 14 FCC Rec at 3238 ("To be
sure, the transfer of the licenses and authorizations is an important part of the merger.
But it is simply not the same thing. The merger is a much larger and more complicated set
of events than the transfer of FCC permits."). In addition, it should be noted that DOJ
review may frequently obviate the violation of the Commission's rules. For example,
AT&T's merger with TCI would have resulted-if approved unconditionally-in a violation
of the Commission's spectrum cap rules. DOJ entered a settlement agreement with AT&T
and TCI that requires the companies to transfer the stock that results in the spectrum cap
violations to a trust administered by an independent trustee. See AT&TITCI, 14 FCC Rec
at 3208-09 9 100. The Commission ultimately imposed the same condition on its approval
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As for the Commission's broad social agenda that transcends
the particular merger before it, that is precisely what its rule-
making power is designed to address. As Justice Douglas ob-
served, "Rule making is no cure-all; but it does force important
issues into full public display and in that sense makes for more
responsible administrative action."241
of the merger. See id at 3210-13 $ 106-12. But DOJ's settlement agreement alone would
have remedied the lack of compliance with the Commission's rules.
241 Wyman-Gordon, 394 US at 779 (Douglas dissenting).
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